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The Right to Vote Under State
Constitutions
Joshua A. Douglas*
This Article provides the first comprehensive look at state
constitutionalprovisions explicitly granting the right to vote. We hear that the
right to vote is "fundamental," the "essence of a democratic society," and
"preservative of all rights." But courts and scholars are still searching for a
solution to the puzzle of how best to protect voting rights, especially because
the U.S. Supreme Court has underenforced the right to vote. The answer,
however, is right in front of us: state constitutions. Virtually every state
constitution includes direct, explicit language granting the right to vote, as
contrasted with the U.S. Constitution, which mentions voting rights only
implicitly. Yet those seeking to protect the right to vote have largely ignored
the force of state constitutions, particularly because many state courts
"lockstep" their state constitutional voting provisions with the narrow
protection the U.S. Supreme Court has afforded under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. This mode of analysis curtails the
broader explicit grant of voting rights in state constitutions.
This Article explains why the lockstepping approach is wrong for the
right to vote and advocates for courts to use a state-focused methodology when
construing their state constitutions. It does so through the lens of recent voter
ID litigation, showing how the outcome of state constitutional challenges to
voter ID laws turns on whether the reviewing state court faithfully and
independently applies the state constitutional provision conferring voting
rights. The textual and substantive differences between U.S. and state
constitutional voting-rights protections requires a state-focused methodology
for state constitutional clauses that grant the right to vote. Article I, Section 2
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of the U.S. Constitutionpoints directly to state qualificationrules to determine
voter eligibility. State constitutions explicitly confer voting rights, while the
U.S. Constitution merely implies the right to vote through negative language.
In addition, the right to vote deserves the most robust protection possible,
which is generally provided within state constitutions. The Article proposes a
test for state courts to use when construing their constitutional voting rights
clauses: a court should hold a law that adds an additional voter qualification
beyond what the state constitution allows to be presumptively invalid;
accordingly, courts should require a state to justify burdens on the right to
vote with specific evidence tied to the legislature's authority under the state
constitution. Finally, an Appendix presents a chart illustratingall fifty state
constitutionsand the language they employ for the right to vote.
I.
II.
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I. INTRODUCTION

What is the right to vote? This question has befuddled courts,'
law professors, 2 historians,3 and policymakers 4 for years. We hear that
the right to vote is "fundamental,"5 the "essence of a democratic
society,"6 and "preservative of all rights."7 We know that voting is
sacred. Yet we are still searching for a solution to the puzzle of how
best to protect voting rights.
The answer, however, is right in front of us: state constitutions.
Virtually every state constitution confers the right to vote to its
citizens in explicit terms.8 Moreover, the U.S. Constitution directs the
inquiry over voter eligibility to state sources. 9 As Justice Scalia
recently declared, the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution
"empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but
not who may vote in them."' 0 Voter eligibility rules are left instead to
the states. But state courts, much like federal courts, have largely
underenforced the right to vote because they have too closely followed
federal court voting-rights jurisprudence. A renewed focus on the
1.
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (entailing four
separate opinions with no majority).
2.
See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361
(2007); Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289
(2011); John M. Greabe, A FederalBaseline for the Right to Vote, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 62
(2012); Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1345 (2003); Richard H. Pildes, What Kind of Right is the 'Right to Vote'?, 93 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 45 (2007).
3.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2009).
4.
See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Waiting Times at Ballot Boxes Draw Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/05/us/politics/waiting-times-to-vote-at-polls-drawscrutiny.html (explaining the efforts of President Obama, members of Congress, and state
legislatures to reform the U.S. electoral system).
5.
E.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); see also Joshua A.
Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 145
(2008); Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 378-79 (2001).
6.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
7.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
8.
See infra Part II.B.
9.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
10. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2250 (2013).
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power of state constitutions provides the answer for how best to
protect the fundamental right to vote.
The year 2012 may go down as the year of voter ID. Courts
considered various aspects of challenges to new requirements that
voters show a photo identification to vote in Pennsylvania,"
Wisconsin,12 Tennessee, 13 Texas,14 and South Carolina.15 The
Department of Justice gave its approval to New Hampshire's voter ID
law' 6 but put Mississippi's voter ID law on hold.' 7 And voters in
Minnesota rejected a constitutional amendment that would have
added a voter ID requirement to the state's election regulations.' 8 In
2013, North Carolina enacted a strict voter ID law, which was
immediately subject to lawsuits in both federal and state courts.19
Several state courts have considered challenges to voter ID
laws under their state constitutions, yet they have diverged markedly
in their analyses. The Pennsylvania court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the state's voter ID requirement violated the

11. See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 3332376 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. Aug. 15) (denying petitioner's application for preliminary injunction of photo ID
requirements), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).
12. See League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669,
2012 WL 763586 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12) (declaring photo ID requirements unconstitutional under
WIS. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 & 2), cert. granted, No. 2012AP584, 2012 WL 1020229 (Wis. Ct. App.
Mar. 28), cert. denied, 811 N.W. 2d 821 (Wis. 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker,
No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6) (granting petitioner's application for
temporary injunction of photo ID requirements), cert. granted, No. 2012AP557-LV, 2012 WL
1020254 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28), cert. denied, 811 N.W. 2d 821 (Wis. 2012).
13. See City of Memphis v. Hargett, No. M2012-02141-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5265006
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2012) (upholding voter ID law), affd, 2013 WL 5655807 (Tenn. Oct. 17,
2013).
14. See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying preclearance under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013).
15. See South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2012) (granting
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act for elections after the 2012 election).

16.

See Terry Frieden, Justice Department OKs New Hampshire Voter ID Law, CNN (Sept.

5, 2012, 5:04 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/05/justice/new-hampshire-voter-idlindex.html.

17.

See Emily Le Coz, Mississippi Voter ID Law Put on Hold for Election Following Federal

Review, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2012, 6:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/03/
mississippi-voter-id-law_n_1934121.html.
18. See Jim Ragsdale, Voter ID Drive Rejected, MINN. STAR TRIB. (Nov. 7, 2012, 9:13 AM),
http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/177543781.html.
19. See Complaint, N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 2013 WL 4053231
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-658), available at http://thenation.s3.amazonaws.com/pdfl
NAACP.vMcCrorryComplaint.pdf; Complaint, Currie v. North Carolina, No. 13-cv-1419 (N.C.
Super. Ct. filed Aug. 13, 2013), available at http://www.southerncoalition.orglwp-content/
uploads/ 2013/08/Currie-v-NC.pdf.
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Pennsylvania Constitution, 20 but two Wisconsin trial courts came to
the opposite conclusion, invalidating that state's law under the
Wisconsin Constitution. 21 Yet the two states' constitutions are
virtually identical. Pennsylvania's Constitution provides that "[e]very
citizen twenty-one years of age, possessing the following
qualifications, shall be entitled to vote at all elections." 22 Wisconsin's
Constitution says that "[e]very United States citizen age 18 or older
who is a resident of an election district in this state is a qualified
elector of that district." 23 The voter ID requirements in these states
were indistinguishable. What, then, explains the differing treatment
from the state courts?
The key distinction is the amount of deference the state courts
gave to federal constitutional interpretation of the right to vote when
construing their respective state constitutions. The Pennsylvania
court used an approach known as "lockstepping," determining that
Pennsylvania's grant of voting rights is coextensive with-and limited
by-federal jurisprudence. 24 By contrast, the Wisconsin courts gave
the Wisconsin Constitution independent force, deciding that it
provides greater protection to the right to vote than does federal law.25
In fact, unlike virtually every state constitution, the U.S.
Constitution does not actually confer the right to vote on anyone. 26
Instead, the right to vote stems from the general language of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the negative
mandates on who the government may not disenfranchise. 2 7 State
constitutions, on the other hand, provide in explicit terms that citizens

20. See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 3332376 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. Aug. 15), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).
21. See League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669,
2012 WL 763586 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12), cert. granted, No. 2012AP584, 2012 WL 1020229 (Wis.
Ct. App. Mar. 28), cert. denied, 811 N.W. 2d 821 (Wis. 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v.
Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6), cert. granted, No. 2012AP557LV, 2012 WL 1020254 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28), cert. denied, 811 N.W. 2d 821 (Wis. 2012). As
discussed below, subsequent to the 2012 election, a Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court and upheld the voter ID law under the Wisconsin Constitution. See League of Women
Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 834 N.W.2d 393 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013); see also infra
notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
22. PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
23. WIS. CONST. art. III, § 1.
24. See Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *7, *16-19.
25. See League of Women Voters, 2012 WL 763586, at *2; Milwaukee NAACP, 2012 WL
739553, at *2.
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
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enjoy the right to vote.28 But state courts use various interpretative
methods to construe state constitutional grants of individual liberties,
including voting rights. 29 Courts that lockstep their state constitutions
with the more limited rights inferred within the U.S. Constitution
derogate the fundamental and foundational right to vote.
This Article details the scope of voting rights under state
constitutions, an overlooked source of the right to vote. It does so
through the lens of recent voter ID litigation, providing a framework
of analysis for courts facing state constitutional disputes over voter ID
laws. The Article contends that litigants should look to state courts to
challenge restrictive voter qualification laws and that state courts
should give independent force to their explicit provisions conferring
the constitutional right to vote.
Part II describes the constitutional underpinning of the right to
vote under both the U.S. Constitution and all fifty state constitutions.
All but one state constitution includes direct language granting voting
rights, as contrasted with the U.S. Constitution, which confers the
right to vote only implicitly. Part III discusses the two main
interpretative lenses through which state courts construe individual
liberties under their constitutions: either a lockstep approach, or a
state-focused methodology, such as interstitial or primacy. When a
state court locksteps, it simply follows federal jurisprudence for the
analogous right without considering whether the state protection is
more robust. By contrast, a state-focused methodology, such as
primacy, first considers the state constitution to determine if it
protects the right in question, only later invoking the "federal floor" of
federal court jurisprudence if the state constitution is insufficient.
Part IV explains why the lockstepping method is wrong for analyzing
the right to vote and advocates for courts to use the primacy approach
instead. That Part highlights how Article I, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution points to state qualification rules to determine voter
eligibility. Part IV then illustrates why the textual differences
between the federal and state constitutions counsel against
lockstepping and in favor of primacy. Finally, Part IV contends that
primacy is best suited to protect voting as the most important,
foundational right in our democracy. Part V provides a workable test
for state courts to use when construing state constitutions: courts
should deem a law that adds an additional voter qualification beyond
what the state constitution allows to be presumptively invalid. Courts
28.
29.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.
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should therefore require states to justify burdens on the right to vote
with specific evidence tied to the legislature's authority under the
state constitution. Part VI concludes. Finally, an Appendix presents a
chart illustrating all fifty state constitutions and the language they
employ for the right to vote.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE RIGHT TO VOTE
There are two sources of constitutional rights: the U.S.
Constitution and state constitutions. Because the former is the
"Supreme Law of the Land," it provides the "floor" of individual
rights.30 State constitutions, on the other hand, can grant more robust
rights. The U.S. Constitution merely implies the right to vote, while
almost all state constitutions explicitly enumerate this right. Because
the right to vote provides the foundation of our democracy, 3 ' we must
understand comprehensively the differing scope of federal and state
constitutional protection. This Part provides details on how both the
U.S. Constitution and each of the fifty state constitutions treat the
right to vote.
A. The Lack of a Specifically Enumerated FederalRight to Vote
The U.S. Constitution does not provide an explicit individual
right to vote. This might seem surprising given that voting is one of
our most cherished rights.32 But the U.S. Constitution confers only
"negative" rights, or prohibitions on governmental action, as opposed
to specifically stated grants of individual liberties. 33 The federal right
to vote is emblematic of this approach.
The U.S. Constitution mentions individual voting rights seven
times-in Article I, Section 2 and in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth
30. See generally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (noting that a state
constitution may afford greater protections than the U.S. Constitution).
31. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
32. See Douglas, supra note 5, at 144-45.
33. See, e.g., Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The Full Realization of Our Rights: The
Right to Health in State Constitutions, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1005 (2010):
The Bill of Rights, which lays out the shared rights of all individuals in the United
States, has been described as granting only negative civil and political rights. These
rights are commonly understood to give individuals protections against government
invasions of their rights as opposed to requiring that the government provide them
with any specific benefits or protections.
See also id. at 1006 (discussing recent scholarly debate on whether the U.S. Constitution grants
affirmative rights).
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Amendments-but none of those provisions actually grant a right to
vote to U.S. citizens. 3 4 Article I, Section 2 provides that, in electing
members of the House of Representatives, "electors in each state shall
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous
branch of the state legislature." 35 That is, the U.S. Constitution does
not provide the qualifications for voters itself but instead delegates
that responsibility to the states. The Seventeenth Amendment has the
same language for the election of U.S. Senators. 36 The Fourteenth
Amendment's "Reduction in Representation" Clause provides that if a
state denies the right to vote to eligible citizens (except based on
participation in a rebellion or other crime), the state loses
representation in its Congressional delegation. 37 This clause does not
provide citizens the right to vote as an explicit liberty but instead
details a potential penalty states will suffer if they deny that right.38
The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments all speak in passive voice, providing that the right to
vote "shall not be denied" according to race (Fifteenth),39 sex
(Nineteenth),40 ability to pay a poll tax (Twenty-Fourth), 41 or age
(Twenty-Sixth). 42 Importantly, none of these provisions declare that
U.S. citizens actually enjoy the right to vote. Instead, each one
delegates the determination of voting qualifications to the states or
explains reasons why the government (state or federal) cannot deny
the right of suffrage. It is no wonder, then, that the U.S. Supreme
Court declared that "the [U.S.] Constitution 'does not confer the right

34. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its
Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 208 (2001) (contrasting the fact that "nothing in the U.S.
Constitution mentions a 'right to vote' in a presidential election" with the U.S. Supreme Court's
statement in Bush v. Gore that "[w]hen the state legislature vests the right to vote for President
in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental"). There have
been frequent calls to amend the U.S. Constitution to include an explicit grant of the right to
vote, but these proposed amendments so far have not had much traction. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 44,
113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkglBILLS-113hjres44ih/pdflBILLS113hjres44ih.pdf.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
36. Id. amend. XVII.
37. Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
38. But see AKHiL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 188-89 (2012) (suggesting that this clause actually grants the right
to vote).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
40. Id. amend. XIX.
41. Id. amend. XXIV.
42. Id. amend. XXVI.
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of suffrage upon any one,' . .. and. . . 'the right to vote, per se, is not a

constitutionally protected right.' "43
Given all of these textual sources of the right to vote-albeit
negatively implied-it might seem surprising that the U.S. Supreme
Court has located the right to vote not in any of these provisions, but
rather in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.44 The
Court settled on this basis for conferring voting rights in a series of
1960s cases under the Warren Court. Subsequent Supreme Court
jurisprudence narrowed the scope of the federal protection of voting
rights by giving states significant leeway to enact election regulations
that do not impose a "severe" burden on the voting process. 45
Early Supreme Court precedent called the right to vote
"fundamental" but did not locate that right in any particular
constitutional provision. 46 The genesis of modern Equal Protection
Clause voting-rights jurisprudence comes from Baker v. Carr, a 1962
case in which the Supreme Court declared that "[a] citizen's right to a
vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially
recognized as a right secured by the Constitution." 47 A few years later,
the Court reiterated the fundamental nature of this right while
explaining the scope of the right's protection:
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic
society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the
weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of
48
the franchise.

The Court, however, still did not cite a specific constitutional provision
in its analysis. Instead, the right to vote seemed to emanate from the
"essence of a democratic society."49
Future cases placed the right to vote. squarely within the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. For example, in

43. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 9 (1982) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874)); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973)).
44. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964);
see AMAR, supra note 38, at 186 ("By reading the equal-protection clause to encompass voting
rights, the Warren Court severed this text from its enacting context and ignored the decisive
understandings of the American people when they ratified these words.").
45. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (explaining that "severe"
restrictions on the right to vote deserve increased scrutiny).
46. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370-71 (1886).

47. 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962).
48. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.

49.

Id.
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Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court acknowledged that
although the U.S. Constitution does not specifically grant a right to
vote in state elections, "once the franchise is granted to the electorate,
lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 0
But the Court later pulled back from robustly recognizing a
federal right to vote by analyzing restrictions of that right through a
lenient balancing test. Two cases in particular, Anderson v. Celebrezze
and Burdick v. Takushi, provide the framework for considering federal
constitutional challenges to state voting regulations.5 1 Known as the
Burdick "severe burden" test, courts first determine whether the state
law in question imposes a severe burden on voters.5 2 If it does, then
the Court applies strict scrutiny review. 53 If the burden is less than
severe, however, then the Court applies a lower, intermediate level of
scrutiny, in which it balances the burdens the law does impose against
the state's valid interests. 54 The Equal Protection Clause provides the
background, prohibiting states from treating one group of voters
differently from others. If the state's interests outweigh the burden on
voting, then the state law is valid, despite the fact that it nevertheless
restricts a so-called fundamental right.55 At the federal level, in other
words, some state impediments to voting are constitutionally
permissible.
Thus, federal courts analyzing restrictions on voting have
narrowed the protection of the right to vote through Anderson and
Burdick's gloss on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. Judicial inquiry focuses on whether the regulation improperly
affects the structure of the election process as opposed to considering
whether it violates the individual right to vote per se.5 6 Of course, a
50. 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
51. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793
(1983).
52. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)); Anderson,
460 U.S. at 793.
53. Burdick, 502 U.S. at 433-34.
54. Id. at 434 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788); see also id. at 433 ("[The mere fact that a
State's system 'creates barriers . . . does not of itself compel close scrutiny.' " (quoting Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972))); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89 (stating that courts are to
determine the constitutionality of a provision "[o]nly after weighing all ... factors").
55. See generally Douglas, supra note 5, at 174 (discussing how the use of the severe burden
test suggests that the Court does not always consider the right to vote to be a "fundamental
right").
56. See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 523-24 (2004) (identifying the "structural harm"
inherent in voting-rights claims); Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the
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court likely would not sanction a wholesale denial of the right to
vote.57 But the Court's Equal Protection Clause voting-rights
jurisprudence sanctions greater voting restrictions than might be
available if there was an explicit right to vote in the U.S.
Constitution.58
The federal right to vote is underenforced under the Burdick
severe burden Equal Protection Clause test because it makes
establishing a violation too difficult for plaintiffs.59 If the right to vote
is a "fundamental right" and the "essence of a democratic society,"60
then legal doctrine should not give so much deference to states'
imposition of voter qualification rules, and courts should not hold
plaintiffs to such a high evidentiary burden. 61 Plaintiffs seeking to
vindicate their rights in the face of a voting regulation must present
specific evidence demonstrating a severe burden, although it is
unclear what kinds of burdens suffice or what makes a particular
burden severe. 62 Moreover, the Court has rejected wholesale facial
challenges to state election-administration laws, requiring piecemeal,
as-applied litigation in which a plaintiff must narrow the claim to
challenge only how the law operates with respect to that particular
plaintiff, regardless of its broader effects on the electorate as a
whole. 63 This also means that, even if the plaintiff wins, the protection
reaches merely that specific voter or that particular instance.64 This
Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2001)
("The Court deploys the Equal Protection Clause not to protect the rights of an identifiable group
of individuals, particularly a group unable to protect itself through operation of the normal
political processes, but rather to regulate the institutional arrangements within which politics is
conducted.") (footnote omitted).
57. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("The right to vote can[not] be denied
outright ..... (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (resting decision on Fifteenth
Amendment))).
58. See Jamin Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for the U.S. Constitution: Confronting
America's Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 559, 572 (2004) ("Our structural
democracy deficit reflects the fact that our pervasive popular beliefs about universal suffrage are
still not embodied in affirmative constitutional language.")
59. See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 98 (2009) ("Yet even
the broadest of these [voting] protections, the Equal Protection Clause, has not been fully
enforced by the Supreme Court.").
60. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
61. See Douglas, supra note 5, at 151-60 (discussing the Court's decisions that cut against
the idea of the right to vote as being a fundamental right).
62. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 59, at 100 (lamenting the "anti-plaintiff, pro-state
evidentiary standard" from recent election-law cases).
63. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied
Challenges in Election Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 681 (2009) (discussing the Court's rejection
of facial claims in recent cases such as Crawford).
64. Id. at 682.
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constricts the scope of federal voter protections because it impedes
federal courts from issuing broader rulings that limit state
curtailment of the right to vote.65 Federal jurisprudence thereby
cabins federal protection of voting rights.
For example, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,
the Supreme Court upheld Indiana's voter ID requirement under a
narrow view of federal constitutional protection of the right to vote. 66
Applying Burdick, the plurality declared that the voter ID law did not
impose a "substantial burden" because the state was applying it to
everyone. 67 The Court explained that "'evenhanded restrictions that
protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself are
not invidious."68 But the Court, in rejecting the plaintiffs facial
challenge, failed to consider whether the law placed restrictions on all
voters beyond what the Constitution allows. Instead, the Court merely
suggested that an as-applied challenge for specific voters could
succeed if a plaintiff could marshal enough evidence on how the law
specifically burdened that voter. Thus, unlike some state courts'
analyses under their state constitutions, 69 the Court did not determine
explicitly whether the law denied the "right to vote."7 0
In sum, the U.S. Constitution does not grant the right to vote.
It instead defines the right through a negative gloss, detailing the
various reasons states cannot limit the franchise. The Supreme Court
has latched onto the Equal Protection Clause to develop the
constitutional test for the right to vote, balancing the burdens on
voters with the state's interest in running an election. This narrows
the protection for the right to vote. Finally, the U.S. Constitution
points to state authority to determine who may vote, at least for

65. Id.
66. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202-04 (2008).
67. Id. at 198, 202-03.
68. Id. at 189-90 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
69. See infra Part IV.
70. Justice Scalia, in his opinion concurring in the judgment, declared that even if the law
impacts people differently, there was a "single burden that the law uniformly imposes on all
voters." Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Because of the
uniform impact, according to Justice Scalia, there was no overall deprivation of the right to vote.
Id. The two dissenting opinions recognized the burden this voter ID law imposed on voters and
therefore would have invalidated the law. See id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Indiana's 'Voter
ID Law' threatens to impose nontrivial burdens on the voting right of tens of thousands of the
State's citizens . . . ."); id. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe statute is unconstitutional
because it imposes a disproportionate burden upon those eligible voters who lack a driver's
license or other statutorily valid form of photo ID.").
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Congressional offices, through Article I, Section 2.71 This clause is the
only federal constitutional provision that actually tells us who may
participate in our democracy. It is therefore important to understand
fully how state constitutions construe the right to vote.
B. State Constitutional Grants of the Right to Vote
In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, all fifty states provide
explicit voting protection for their citizens. 72 This Section sets out the
scope of that right, detailing state constitutional provisions on voter
qualifications.
Forty-nine states explicitly grant the right to vote through
specific language in their state constitutions.7 3 The text is typically
couched in terms that a citizen "shall be qualified to vote," 74 "shall be
entitled to vote," 75 or "is a qualified elector." 76 Most of these provisions
directly define who is eligible to vote, such as that "[e]very United
States citizen age 18 or older who is a resident of an election district in
this state is a qualified elector of that district."77 That is, state
constitutions grant voting rights to all individuals who are citizens of
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also id. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall
be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof. . . .").

72.

See Jamin B. Raskin, Is There a ConstitutionalRight to Vote and Be Represented? The

Case of the District of Columbia, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 589, 612-13 (1999) ("The state constitutions
clearly do, every one of them, grant a substantive right to vote. The documents set out
qualifications for electors, and if you meet those qualifications, then you have a right to vote in
those state elections.").
73. See infra Appendix. As discussed below, the only state constitution that does not include
explicit language granting the right to vote is Arizona's.
74. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("shall be qualified to vote at all elections"); HAW.
CONST. art. II, § 1 ("shall be qualified to vote in any state or local election"); N.M. CONST. art.
VII, § 1 ("shall be qualified to vote at all elections for public officers").
75. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, II ("shall be entitled to vote at any election"); IOWA
CONST. art. II, § 1 ("shall be entitled to vote at all elections"); MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("shall
be entitled to vote in that precinct"); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 1, 3 ("shall be entitled to vote for all
officers"); N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("shall be entitled to vote at every election"); N.C. CONST. art.
VI, § 1 ("shall be entitled to vote at any election"); OR. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("is entitled to vote in
all elections"); PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("shall be entitled to vote at all elections"); S.D. CONST.
art. VII, §§ 1, 2 ("shall be entitled to vote in all elections"); WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1 ("shall be
entitled to vote at all elections'); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("shall be entitled to vote at all
elections"); WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("shall be entitled to vote at such election").
76. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("is a qualified elector"); KAN. CONST. art. V, § 1
("shall be deemed a qualified elector"); ME. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("shall be an elector"); MICH.
CONST. art. II, § 1 ("shall be an elector"); MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 ("is declared to be a
qualified elector"); MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("is a qualified elector"); NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 1
("shall ... be an elector"); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("are qualified electors"); WIS. CONST. art.
III, § 1 ("is a qualified elector").
77. WIS. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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the United States, residents of the state for a certain period preceding
the election, and over eighteen years old. Some state constitutions also
authorize legislatures to set out rules for registering voters78 or to
provide for absentee balloting 9 or early voting.80 Certain state
constitutions deny voting rights to convicted felons or mentally
incompetent persons.8 Finally, a few state constitutions allow the
state's legislature to enact other "necessary" voting procedures to root
out fraud or protect the integrity of the election process. 82 But at
bottom, state constitutions include specific language granting voting
rights to the state's citizens.
Only Arizona's constitution does not explicitly grant the right
to vote, instead stating that "[n]o person shall be entitled to
vote . . . unless" the person meets the citizenship, residency, and age
requirements. 83 This language still implicitly grants the right to vote,
albeit in the reverse of all other states, because it provides who may
not vote (no one unless they meet the state's eligibility requirements).
Arizona also mimics the U.S. Constitution in discussing the right to
vote in negative terms by prohibiting the denial of voting rights on the
78. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 147 ("The General Assembly shall provide by law for the
registration of all persons entitled to vote . . . ."); N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("Every person offering
to vote shall be at the time legally registered as a voter as herein prescribed and in the manner
provided by law.").
79. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The legislature shall provide for the registration of
voters and for absentee voting. . . ."); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 11:
The general court shall provide by law for voting by qualified voters who . . . are
absent from the city or town of which they are inhabitants, or who by reason of
physical disability are unable to vote in person, in the choice of any officer or officers
to be elected or upon any question submitted at such election.
80. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. I, § 2(b):
The General Assembly shall have the power to provide by suitable enactment a
process to allow qualified voters to vote at polling places in or outside their election
districts or wards or, during the two weeks immediately preceding an election, on no
more than 10 other days prior to the dates specified in this Constitution.
81. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 145 (excepting "[i]diots and insane persons" from the right to
vote); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 1, 1 7 ('The Legislature may pass laws to deprive persons of the right
of suffrage who shall be convicted of such crimes as it may designate. Any person so deprived,
when pardoned or otherwise restored by law to the right of suffrage, shall again enjoy that
right.").

82.

See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. V,

§ 1 ("[T]he General Assembly may by law prescribe the

means, methods and instruments of voting so as best to . . . prevent fraud, corruption and
intimidation threat."); MD. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("The General Assembly shall pass Laws necessary
for the preservation of the purity of Elections.").
83. ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2 ("No person shall be entitled to vote ... unless such person be
a citizen of the United States of the age of eighteen years or over, and shall have resided in the
state for the period of time preceding such election as prescribed by law . . . ."). It is unclear why
Arizona chose not to include an explicit grant of the right to vote; the constitutional history is
murky on this point.
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basis of sex. 84 Arizona's constitution further declares that elections
must be "free and equal."85 But as noted, Arizona is the lone exception;
state constitutions are otherwise remarkably uniform in explicitly
granting the states' citizens the right to vote.
As an added level of protection, twenty-six states include a
provision in their constitutions stating that elections shall be "free,"
"free and equal," or "free and open."86 Although the terms "free and
equal" or "free and open" might seem amorphous, several state courts
have construed this language as guaranteeing all eligible voters access
to the ballot.87 For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court explained
that a state constitution's "free and equal" or "free and open" elections
clause "connotes [that] all eligible voters should have the chance to
vote."88 As Kentucky's highest court long ago explained-in a passage
that several other courts have cited 89-a constitutional provision
declaring elections to be "free and equal" is "mandatory": "It applies to
all elections, and no election can be free and equal, within its
meaning, if any substantial number of persons entitled to vote are
denied the right to do so."90
Id. art. VII, § 2.
85. Id. art. II, § 21.
84.

86. See infra Appendix. These states are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
87. See, e.g., Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that the
plaintiffs had stated a valid cause of action under the state constitution's "free and equal"
provision based on voting machines not counting ballots properly); Neelley v. Farr, 158 P. 458,
467 (Colo. 1916) (noting that, under the "free and equal" clause in Colorado's Constitution, "[if a
voter] is deterred from the exercise of his free will by means of any influence whatever, although
there be neither violence nor physical coercion, it is not a free and equal election within the spirit
of the Constitution") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Wallbrecht v. Ingram, 175
S.W. 1022, 1026-27 (Ky. 1915) (holding that an election in which some voters were denied the
right to vote because of a ballot shortage was neither free nor equal); Gunaji v. Macias, 31 P.3d
1008, 1016 (N.M. 2001) ("[A]n election is only 'free and equal' if the ballot allows the voter to
choose between the lawful candidates for that office . . . .").
88. Gunaji, 31 P.3d at 1016. For an extensive discussion of Pennsylvania's "free and equal"

clause, see Matthew C. Jones, Fraudand the Franchise: The Pennsylvania Constitution's 'Free
and Equal Election" Clause as an Independent Basis for State and Local Election Challenges, 68
TEMP. L. REV. 1473 (1995). For a similar discussion of Montana's "free and open" provision, see

Hannah Tokerud, Comment, The Right of Suffrage in Montana: Voting Protections Under the
State Constitution, 74 MONT. L. REV. 417 (2013).
89. See Gunaji, 31 P.3d at 1016 ("Kentucky has the most developed jurisprudence of any
state on what that clause means in relation to ballot problems."); see also Chavez, 214 P.3d at
407-08 ("The Court of Appeals of Kentucky long ago announced that 'no election can be free and
equal . .. if any substantial number of persons entitled to vote are denied the right to do so.'"
(quoting Wallbrecht, 175 S.W. at 1026-27)).

90.

Wallbrecht, 175 S.W. at 1026-27.
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Finally, fifteen state constitutions mirror the U.S. Constitution
in delineating voting rights through indirect, negative language
declaring when the state may not infringe the right to vote on the
basis of certain characteristics.9 1 For example, New Mexico's
constitution has an extensive list of reasons why the state may not
deny voting rights, including on account of "religion, race, language or
color, or inability to speak, read or write the English or Spanish
languages."92 The New Mexico Constitution also prohibits the state
from requiring a poll tax to vote. 93 In addition to these fifteen states,
other state constitutions provide more generically that "no power" may
interfere with the right of free suffrage or that there shall be "no
hindrance" on voting. 94

Table 1: State Constitutional Provisions on the Right to Vote
State Constitutional Provision

Number of States

Explicit grant of the right to vote

49

Elections shall be "free," "free and
equal," or "free and open"
Implicit grant of the right to vote
through negative language

26
15

In sum, state constitutions go well beyond the U.S.
Constitution in discussing the right to vote. In fact, most state
constitutions have a separate article specifically dealing with elections
and the franchise.9 5 Unlike the U.S. Constitution, these state
constitutional provisions explicitly grant the right to vote to all
91. See Appendix. These states are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. Eight of these fifteen states also include a "free and equal" or "free and
open" clause; the states with both kinds of provisions are Arizona, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Seven states (all of these states besides
Arizona) also explicitly grant the right to vote, meaning that they have all three provisions in
their constitutions.
92. N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
93. Id. art. VII, § 2.
94. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("[Tlhere shall be no hindrance or impediment to the
right of a qualified voter to exercise the elective franchise."); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("No
power ... shall ever interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage . . . ."); PA.
CONST. art. I, § 5 (same); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (same); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 19 (same).
95. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. II ("Voting and Elections"); MONT. CONST. art. IV ("Suffrage
and Elections").
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citizens who meet simple qualification rules. Given that the U.S.
Constitution actually points to state rules for voter eligibility, 96 there
must be a renewed focus on these state constitutional grants of voting
rights, especially in the context of increased state court litigation over
voter ID laws. In particular, as discussed below, state courts should
not interpret their constitutional provisions to be in lockstep with
federal jurisprudence because the U.S. Constitution explicitly points
to state voter eligibility rules for determining who is qualified to vote
in federal elections. State court jurisprudence also should be more
robust than federal law because state constitutions go further than
the U.S. Constitution in specifically conferring voting rights. That is, a
faithful understanding of federal and state constitutional structure
and of the differences between how each document grants voting
rights both counsel toward an approach that recognizes state
constitutions' independent force.
III. STATE JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

State courts construe state constitutional provisions regarding
individual rights either under a lockstep approach or through a statefocused mechanism, such as the interstitial or primacy approaches. 97
When courts lockstep, they automatically adopt federal jurisprudence
for the right at issue, declaring that state law goes only as far as
federal law. Under an interstitial methodology, courts first consider
the "federal floor" under the U.S. Constitution before then analyzing
independently whether the state constitution provides greater
protection. A primacy approach is the opposite of lockstep: it first
considers the state constitution and relies on the U.S. Constitution
only if state protection is not robust enough to vindicate the plaintiffs'
rights. This Part outlines these methods and explains how courts have
construed voting-rights provisions under each interpretive lens.
96. U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 2.

97. Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of 10,000
Lakes: Minnesota's Approach to ProtectingIndividual Rights Under Both the United States and
Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REV. 865, 879 (2007).
Some commentators have suggested that these categories are too rigid and formulaic.
See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 47 (2005) (noting that while a few
state courts deliberately choose to follow either the interstitial or primacy approaches, these
courts "have rarely stuck to their methodological commitments"). Although it is true that there
can be overlap between the various approaches-especially the nonlockstep methods-separating
state constitutional interpretation into these groups is useful for understanding how state courts
tackle these issues.
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A. Lockstep
The U.S. Constitution reflects the federal floor of individual
rights because the Supremacy Clause forbids state courts from
providing less protection than what the U.S. Constitution
guarantees.98 When state courts lockstep, they follow the U.S.
Supreme Court's lead in construing the scope of these individual
rights.99 In essence, state courts analyze the analogous rights in the
state constitution as conferring the same level of protection as their
federal counterparts. 00 The state right is thereby the same as the
federal floor. This lockstepping approach is also known as
"convergence."10'
Commentators have suggested that this "absolute harmony"
methodology is actually a "non-approach to state interpretation
because it results in absolute deferential conformity with [U.S.]
Supreme Court interpretations."102 It does lead to uniformity on a
particular question, though, as state courts that follow the lockstep
approach will provide the exact same protection for the right as
federal courts do under the U.S. Constitution.103 But this is
problematic when federal protection is insufficient, as is the case with
voting rights.
Lockstepping is fairly common with regard to the right to
vote.104 A prominent example comes from the Pennsylvania voter ID
98. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2; see Anderson & Oseid, supra note 97, at 875 ("All American
citizens are guaranteed the protections of the United States Constitution. This guarantee is
sometimes described as the federal floor. State courts must protect individual rights at the
minimum level prescribed by the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. . . .").
99. See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 97, at 875.
100. Id. at 880.
101. See Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Speech, Presenting a State Constitutional
Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 645 (1987) (discussing the
"lock-step" approach to interpreting state constitutional provisions that have "federal analogs");

Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1502 (2005)
(contrasting the prevalence of "lockstepping" and "doctrinal convergence" in practice with the
relative lack of academic exploration of lockstepping). Professor Williams suggests that there are
actually four variations of lockstepping: "unreflective adoptionism," "reflective adoption,"
"prospective lockstepping," and prospective adoption of a U.S. Supreme Court "test." Id. at 150415.
102. Utter & Pitler, supra note 101, at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 97, at 881 (discussing the advantages of lockstepping,
including "national uniformity").
104. As one commentator notes, lockstepping is the prevailing norm for most state
constitutional adjudication. See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts
in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 338 (2002) (explaining that "systematic studies
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litigation preceding the 2012 election.105 Plaintiffs in that case
challenged Pennsylvania's new voter ID requirement under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, not the U.S. Constitution. 0 6 Specifically,
the plaintiffs invoked both Article VII, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which discusses "[q]ualifications of electors" and
provides that the state's citizens "shall be entitled to vote," and Article
I, Section 5, which states that elections shall be "free and equal." 07
Presumably, the plaintiffs focused their argument on the
Pennsylvania Constitution and did not invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because they wished to avoid
an analysis under the U.S. Supreme Court's 2008 decision in
Crawford,108 which, as previously noted, upheld a similar Indiana law.
But that strategy failed. Although the Pennsylvania trial court
discussed various Pennsylvania cases, it consistently fell back on
Crawford for its substantive analysis. For example, in the section
titled "Legal Standard for Challenge," the judge stated, "I start my
analysis with the United States Supreme Court." 09 The court then
spent several pages outlining in detail the Crawford decision.11 0 The
court's next step was to "employ[] the federal 'flexible' standard
discussed in Crawford" to "reach the same conclusions the United
States Supreme Court reached."' The court explained that if it had
applied strict scrutiny instead of the more deferential standard from
Crawford, then it "might reach a different determination."" 2 The U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, therefore, paved the path for
the Pennsylvania court's converging analysis under the Pennsylvania
demonstrate that most state courts, when presented with the opportunity, have chosen not to
depart from federal precedents when interpreting the rights-granting provisions of state
constitutions"). For a discussion of Illinois's "limited lockstep" approach as well as an argument
against its use, see James K. Leven, A Roadmap to State Judicial Independence Under the
Illinois Limited Lockstep Doctrine Predicated on the Intent of the Framers of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution and Illinois Tradition, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 63, 110-13, 119 (2012) (advocating
straightforward analysis of the state constitutional provision at issue instead of relying on the
"red herring" of comparison with the U.S. Constitution).
105. See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *29 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Aug. 15) (following the U.S. Supreme Court's test from Crawford to uphold
Pennsylvania's voter ID law and "employ[ing] the same standards applicable to federal equal
protection claims" to evaluate the Pennsylvania Constitution's equal protection provision),
vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).
106. Id. at *1.
107. Id. at *9; see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 5, art. VII, § 1.
108. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008).
109. Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *16.
110. Id. at *16-20.
111. Id. at *29.
112. Id.
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Constitution. Although the court did not explicitly state that it was
lockstepping the scope of voting rights under Pennsylvania's
Constitution with the U.S. Constitution, its mode of analysis placed
the two protections of the right to vote in "absolute harmony."" 3 This
interpretation means that Pennsylvania's grant of voting rights in
Article VII, Section 1 of its constitution is in lockstep with the U.S.
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause ven though those two
provisions are textually and substantively different. The U.S.
Constitution does not explicitly grant the right to vote, while the
Pennsylvania Constitution does, yet the court construed the two
constitutions to be coextensive and therefore substantively identical.
This suggests that the Pennsylvania Constitution's explicit grant of
the right to vote is irrelevant, because the court simply followed the
U.S. Constitution's lead even though it lacks the same substantive
provision.114 The Pennsylvania court, therefore, implicitly used the
lockstep approach to reject the plaintiffs' challenge to the voter ID law
by analyzing the state constitution's voting qualifications provision
under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause in Crawford.
The Indiana Supreme Court, in a follow-up to the Crawford
decision, also construed its state constitutional grant of the right to
vote to be in lockstep with the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of
federal protection." 5 The Indiana Constitution provides that "[a]ll
elections shall be free and equal""6 and that "[a] citizen of the United
States, who is at least eighteen (18) years of age and who has been a
resident of a precinct thirty (30) days immediately preceding an
election may vote in that precinct at the election."" 7 The Indiana
Supreme Court held that the state's voter ID law was not a
"substantive qualification to the right to vote" but instead was "merely
regulatory in nature."" 8 To reach this conclusion, the court explained
that the U.S. Supreme Court had found persuasive that "Congress
'believes that photo identification is one effective method of
establishing a voter's qualification to vote and that the integrity of
113. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 101, at 645 (describing the "absolute harmony"
approach).
114. In a separate section of the opinion, the court acknowledged that it was construing the
federal and Pennsylvania equal protection clauses to be "coextensive." Applewhite, 2012 WL
3332376, at *29. The federal and state equal protection clauses, however, are substantively
similar, so it makes more sense to lockstep the state's provision with federal jurisprudence.
115. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 767 (Ind. 2010).
116. IND. CONST. art. II, § 1.
117. Id. art. II, § 2.
118. League of Women Voters ofInd., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 767.
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elections is enhanced through improved technology.' "119 That is, the
Indiana Supreme Court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's discussion
of Indiana's voter ID law-even though the U.S. Supreme Court
decided a federal constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause and the Indiana Supreme Court was considering a differently
worded and voting-specific Indiana constitutional provision.
Other state courts also have employed the lockstep approach
for the right to vote, including in litigation not involving voter ID. For
instance, the Alaska Supreme Court construed a statute that allocated
candidate positions on ballots as a "direct burden on the right to vote
instead of as an equal protection violation," but it still cited the U.S.
Supreme Court's federal Equal Protection Clause standard from
Burdick v. Takushi to determine the proper level of scrutiny and mode
of analysis. 120 Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court, without much
discussion, refused to give its constitution's mandate that elections be
"free and open" any greater protection than what the U.S.
Constitution provides regarding political participation
and
association.121
Finally, many state courts lockstep their state equal protection
clauses with the federal Equal Protection Clause. 122 For example, the
Georgia Supreme Court rejected a challenge to that state's voter ID
requirement under its equal protection clause by citing Crawford,
explaining that "this Court has repeatedly stated that the Georgia
[equal protection] clause is generally 'coextensive' with and
'substantially equivalent' to the federal equal protection clause, and
that we apply them as one." 123 The Georgia court invoked the federal
Equal Protection Clause's severe burden balancing test to uphold the
law. 124 From a textual perspective, it might make sense to lockstep a
state's equal protection clause to its federal counterpart because the
language in each clause is virtually identical. In addition, both federal
and state equal protection clauses have very similar substantive
purposes: ensuring equality. A state court is therefore reasonably
justified in using a lockstep methodology for a state's equal protection

119. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 193 (2008)).
120. Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d 632, 637-38 (Alaska 1998) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428 (1992)).
121. MacGuire v. Houston, 717 P.2d 948, 954-55 (Colo. 1986).
122. See supra Part II.A (discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases that locate the right to vote
within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment),
123. Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 74-75 (Ga. 2011).
124. Id.
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clause.125 This approach, however, is quite different from using a
lockstep analysis to deny a state's separate and differently worded
voter qualification provision any independent force. 26
In sum, even though virtually every state constitution contains
a provision that explicitly grants the right to vote to its residents,
many state courts do not construe those provisions to have any
separate meaning from federal voting-rights jurisprudence under the
U.S. Constitution. Instead, these state courts use the lockstep method
to define the scope of the clauses in their constitutions, typically
rejecting challenges to a state's practice in the process. This analysis,
as discussed below, has an inherent dissonance, as state courts are
lockstepping a specific and explicit voter qualification provision with
federal court interpretation of the implied right to vote within the
general language of the Equal Protection Clause. The result is often a
derogation of citizens' state constitutional right to vote.127
B. Nonlockstep: State-Focused Interpretive Methods
Unlike a lockstepping analysis, some state courts recognize
that their constitutions go further than the U.S. Constitution in
conferring voting rights. The two main nonlockstep methodologies are
the interstitial and primacy approaches.1 28 While different in their
125. A state court, of course, also could decide to give its identically worded constitutional
language greater force to provide more robust protection to its citizens.
126. The Georgia Supreme Court actually undertook an independent analysis for its
constitutional provision on voter qualifications, without citing federal jurisprudence, but it still
rejected the plaintiffs' argument. The court ruled that the voter ID law did not impose an
additional voter qualification and was consistent with the Georgia Constitution's broad grant of
authority to the legislature to regulate elections. DemocraticParty of Ga., Inc., 707 S.E.2d at 72
(citing GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, 1 1 ("Elections by the people ... shall be conducted in accordance
with procedures provided by law.")).
127. See infra Part IV.A (rejecting the lockstep approach because it fails to provide the best
protection for the right to vote).
128. Some commentators have advocated for a third nonlockstep approach, which they call
dual sovereignty, that looks at the federal and state constitutions as coequals and requires courts
to analyze the rights protection of both in every case. See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 97, at
884 (describing an approach in which courts analyze both the state constitution and the U.S.
constitution and choose the interpretation that provides the most protection for the right); Utter
& Pitler, supra note 101, at 652 (advocating for the dual-sovereignty approach because it
maximizes protection of individuals' constitutional rights and facilitates the development of a
"principled, independent state jurisprudence"). "In essence, the court does not give deference to
one direction over the other, it only relies on the constitution that provides the greatest
protection." Anderson & Oseid, supra note 97, at 884. Few courts, however, have adopted the
dual-sovereignty approach, and state constitutional theorists have largely discredited this
methodology.

See,

e.g.,

ROBERT
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SCHAPIRO,

POLYPHONIC
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THE

PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 54-56, 72-73 (2009) (explaining the Court's "dualist"
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initial foci, they share a commonality of giving independent force to
state constitutional protections of individual liberties, such as the
right to vote. The difference is largely in whether a court looks to its
state's constitution or the U.S. Constitution first; a court employing an
interstitial approach will consider the state constitution only if the
federal protection is insufficient, while a court invoking the primacy
method will start with the state constitution.
1. Interstitial
A state court that uses the interstitial approach may consider
both its state constitution and the U.S. Constitution to protect the
individual right to vote. 129 A court following this method first analyzes
how the U.S. Constitution and federal court precedent construe the
right.18 0 If the court determines that the "federal floor" does not
adequately safeguard the right at issue, it will then decide whether
the state constitution provides a more robust, independent source of
rights protection.' 3 ' That is, the court will consider the state
constitution only if the U.S. Constitution is not broad enough to
protect sufficiently the right in question.132 In this way, the U.S.
Constitution and its accompanying case law has the first shot at
providing an interpretative lens under which the state court will
consider the issue.133 If, however, the "federal floor" is unsatisfactory,
then the court will turn to the state constitution and conduct an
independent inquiry.134 State constitutional law becomes a
"supplement[ ]"to federal constitutional protection.135
To determine when it is appropriate to look to the state
constitution after first analyzing the federal protection, courts use a
set of "neutral" criteria. 36 The factors courts consider include "textual
differences, legislative history, preexisting state law, structural
differences between state and federal constitutions, matters of
particular local or state interest, state traditions or history, and

conception of federalism but rejecting it as unhelpful in solving the central question of allocation
of powers and unnecessary where administrative decentralization is an option).
129. Anderson & Oseid, supra note 97, at 881.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 881-82.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 101, at 648-49.
136. See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 97, at 882.
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particular attitudes of the state's citizens."'37 Federal constitutional
protection thus enjoys a presumption of adequacy in state courts
unless, under the neutral criteria, there is a reason to look to the state
constitution. 1 38
Michigan's voter ID litigation exemplifies the interstitial
approach in the voting-rights context. 139 In that case, the Michigan
House of Representatives asked the Michigan Supreme Court to issue
an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of Michigan's voter ID
requirement. 140 The court held that the voter ID law did not violate
the Michigan Constitution's declaration that "[n]o person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied
the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated
against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or
national origin."14 1 The court explained that, although the Michigan
Equal Protection Clause is coextensive with the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Michigan Constitution's
nondiscrimination clause also protects "political rights."142 In other
words, the court first considered the U.S. Constitution and used a
lockstep approach for the equal protection language.143 However, the
court recognized that, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Michigan
Constitution also protects "political rights," so it conducted a separate
analysis under that clause. 144 Despite ultimately adopting the same
severe burden test that federal courts use under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Michigan court reached that conclusion not by
lockstepping but by deciding under its independent analysis that
Burdick also provided the best mechanism to interpret the state
constitution.14 5 That is, the court used the Burdick framework not
137. Id. (citing Utter & Pitler, supra note 101, at 649-50 n.120); see also Am. Ass'n of People
with Disabilities v. Herrera, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1209 (D.N.M. 2010) ("A state court adopting
this approach may diverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal analysis,
structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics."
(quoting State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997))).
138. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 101, at 650.
139. In re Request for Advisory Op. Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d
444, 463 (Mich. 2007).
140. Id. at 447-48.
141. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2.
142. In re Request for Advisory Op., 740 N.W.2d at 449, 459-60.
143. Id. at 452-53.
144. Id. at 459-63.

145. Id. at 463 n.90. This is an example of what Robert Williams calls "reflective adoption."
See Williams, supra note 101, at 1506 (describing "reflective adoption" as "a state court decision
acknowledging the possibility of different state and federal outcomes, considering the arguments
in the specific case and, on balance, deciding to apply federal analysis to the state provision").
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because it necessarily sought to follow federal jurisprudence but
because it determined, pursuant to its independent analysis, that
Burdick also provided the appropriate test under the state
constitution.
Ultimately, the court upheld the constitutionality of the voter
ID law, even under the "political rights" clause, because the Michigan
Constitution delegates to the legislature the authority to "preserve the
purity of elections" and "to guard against abuses of the elective
franchise." 46 The court found that the law was proper under these
provisions. 147 That is debatable as a factual matter-whether voter ID
laws actually preserve the integrity of elections is a hotly contested
question. 148 But the evidentiary decision in this particular case is
separate from how the court understood the source of voter
protections. The key question is whether state courts will give their
state constitutional provisions independent force in the face of narrow
federal court interpretations of voting rights in the U.S. Constitution.
Through the interstitial approach, the Michigan Supreme Court did
just that.
As another example, the New Mexico Supreme Court
acknowledged that its constitution confers added protections to its
citizens through its "free and open" elections clause. 149 New Mexico
uses the interstitial approach, 1 0 and because there is no federal
constitutional counterpart, the court fashioned its own state rule
regarding the scope of that clause. 151 The court concluded that an
election is "free and open" only "if the ballot allows the voter to choose
between the lawful candidates for that office." 52 In some ways, the
146. In re Request for Advisory Op., 740 N.W.2d at 463 (citing MICH. CONST. art. II,

§ 4).

147. Id.
148. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 635 (2007) ("No
systematic, empirical study of the magnitude of voter fraud has been conducted at either the
national level or in any state to date, but the best existing data suggests that a photoidentification requirement would do more harm than good."); Michael J. Pitts, Empirically

Assessing the Impact of Photo Identificationat the Polls Through an Examination of Provisional
Balloting, 24 J.L. & POL. 475, 475 (2008) (noting that the "debate over photo identification laws
remains far from any definitive conclusion"); see also Shelley de Alth, ID at the Polls: Assessing

the Impact of Recent State Voter ID Laws on Voter Turnout, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 185, 186
(2009) (highlighting the lack of data on the impact of voter ID laws and examining the effect of
voter ID laws on turnout).
149. Gunaji v. Macias, 31 P.3d 1008, 1015-16 (N.M. 2001) (quoting N.M. CONST. art. II, § 8).
150. State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7-8 (N.M. 1997); see also Am. Ass'n of People with
Disabilities v. Herrera, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1208 (D.N.M. 2010) ("The Supreme Court of New
Mexico applies the interstitial approach to interpreting the New Mexico Constitution.").
151. Gunaji, 31 P.3d at 1016.
152. Id.
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New Mexico approach is similar to the state-first primacy method
discussed below, because the court did not consider explicitly the
federal constitutional protection for the right to vote. But this is likely
only because there is no obvious federal right similar to the state
constitution's "free and open" provision. Facing only a state-created
right, the court undertook only a state-focused analysis, even though
as a general rule New Mexico follows the interstitial approach. This
demonstrates how, although they often have different starting points,
the nonlockstep interpretive methodologies are similar in the
importance they place on state-conferred rights.
Ultimately, then, the interstitial approach is better at
safeguarding voting rights than lockstepping because it at least leaves
the door open for a separate interpretation under a more robust state
constitution. But this methodology also might encourage a state court
to adopt the narrower federal test as its own, as the Michigan court
did in its voter ID decision. This is because the federal analysis, which
comes first, might color the state interpretation. The next approach,
however, gives state constitutions even more authority in protecting
individual rights because it is not hampered with any explicit federal
analysis.
2. Primacy
The primacy approach is, in essence, the exact opposite of the
lockstep method. Instead of construing state constitutions to be in
absolute harmony with the U.S. Constitution, state courts employing
primacy start with the state constitution.153 A court's analysis thus
begins and usually ends with the state constitution, and the court
considers the federal floor only if the state constitutional protection
does not cover the right in question.154 Federal constitutional
interpretation is merely persuasive in primacy-based state
153. See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 97, at 885 ("A state court taking the primacy
approach looks first to its own constitution."); see also Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process'
UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 182-183 (1970):
[W]here a state law unavoidably faces a serious claim of constitutional right, the basis
for that claim in the state constitution should be examined first, before any issue
under the federal fourteenth amendment. To begin with the federal claim, as is
customarily done, implicitly admits that the guarantees of the state's constitution are
ineffective to protect the asserted right and that only the intervention of the federal
constitution stands between the claimant and the state. . . . . The customary
assumption that the guarantees in the state constitution intend to protect the same
interests against the same abuses as those in the federal Constitution, only phrased
somewhat differently, is too facile ....
154. See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 97, at 885; see also Utter & Pitler, supra note 101, at
647.
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jurisprudence, with no presumptive validity.155 This method
exemplifies "judicial federalism," in which state courts recognize that
"[s]tate constitutions ... are a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law." 56 "Thus," as commentators
have explained, "primacy courts focus on the state constitution as an
independent source of rights, rely on it as the fundamental law, and
do not address federal constitutional issues unless the state
constitution does not provide the protection sought." 5 7 Primacy
therefore differs from the interstitial method in its analytical starting
place: while an interstitial approach looks first to the U.S.
Constitution, primacy begins with the state.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in its 2006 voter ID decision, set
out the reasons for using this state-focused method quite nicely,
contrasting the voter protection provisions in both the U.S. and
Missouri Constitutions:
The express constitutional protection of the right to vote differentiates the Missouri
constitution from its federal counterpart. Federal courts also have consistently held that
the right to vote is equally fundamental under the United States Constitution. But, the
right to vote in state elections is conferred under federal law only by implication, not by
express guarantee.
Moreover, the qualifications for voting under the federal system are left to
legislative determination, not constitutionally enshrined, as they are in Missouri.
Compare U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 2 (providing that "Electors" shall be equivalent to those
for state positions) with Mo. Const. art. VIII, sec. 2 (establishing exclusive qualifications
for voting in Missouri). Compare also U.S. Const. amend. XV (protecting right to vote
from abridgment "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude") with Mo.
Const. art. I, see. 25 (protecting right to vote from all "power, civil or military" that
"interferes to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage"). 158

Thus, the Missouri court recognized that, although both the
U.S. Constitution and the state constitution safeguard the right to
vote, the broader state constitution provides an independent and
explicit voting protection.159 So construed, the voter ID law violated
the Missouri Constitution's conferral to Missouri citizens of a
"fundamental right to vote." 60 The court acknowledged that the U.S.
155. Utter & Pitler, supranote 101, at 647.
156. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
157. Utter & Pitler, supranote 101, at 647.
158. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 211-12 (Mo. 2006) (citations and footnote
omitted).
159. Id. at 216 ("Here, the issue is constitutionality under Missouri's Constitution, not under
the United States Constitution.").
160. Id. at 212-13 (citing MO. CONST. art. I, § 25).
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Constitution still provides a floor of protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Under that Burdick analysis,
the voter ID law imposed a severe burden and would trigger strict
scrutiny review.161 But the court, while giving credence to the U.S.
Constitution's more limited protection of voting rights, focused its
analysis on the Missouri Constitution. Missouri's constitution goes
beyond the federal floor, so even if the law were permissible under the
U.S. Constitution, the court would invalidate it under the state
constitution using the primacy methodology.
The 2012 Wisconsin voter ID litigation involved two trial court
decisions that also exhibited the primacy approach, and both courts
struck down the law under the state constitution. 162 Wisconsin's
constitution provides that "[elvery United States citizen age 18 or
older who is a resident of an election district in this state is a qualified
elector of that district." 163 A judge considering the constitutionality of
Wisconsin's newly enacted voter ID law found that the law added an
additional qualification to vote, contrary to the mandate of this
constitutional provision.16 4 Although acknowledging that the U.S.
Constitution also speaks to the issue through the Equal Protection
Clause, the court rejected the state government's reliance on
Crawford, explaining that "this case is founded upon the Wisconsin
Constitution which expressly guarantees the right to vote while
Crawford was based upon the U.S. Constitution which offers no such
guarantee."165 The court therefore focused its analysis on Wisconsin's
more robust voting-rights provision to invalidate the voter ID law.166
The other trial court considering this law did not even mention the
federal right to vote or cite a single federal court decision in finding
that the voter ID requirement "abridge[s] the right to vote" in
violation of the Wisconsin Constitution. 6 7 The court explained that

161. Id. at 216.
162. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669, 2012
WL 763586 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12), cert. granted, No. 2012AP584, 2012 WL 1020229 (Wis. Ct.
App. Mar. 28), cert. denied, 811 N.W. 2d 821 (Wis. 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v.
Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6), cert. granted, No. 2012AP557LV, 2012 WL 1020254 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28), cert. denied, 811 N.W. 2d 821 (Wis. 2012).
163. WIs. CONST. art. III, § 1.
164. Milwaukee NAACP, 2012 WL 739553.
165. Id. pt. X.
166. Id. pts. VIII-IX.
167. League of Women Voters, 2012 WL 763586, pts. I-II:
[The Wisconsin Constitution] is unambiguous, and means exactly what it
says .

..

. Every United States citizen 18 years of age or older who resides in an

election district in Wisconsin is a qualified elector in that district, unless excluded by
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"[t]he government may not disqualify an elector who possesses those
qualifications [to vote as listed in the Wisconsin Constitution] on the
grounds that the voter does not satisfy additional statutorily-created
qualifications not contained in Article III [of the Wisconsin
Constitution], such as photo ID."16 8 The Wisconsin Constitution's
explicit voting-rights provision provided the only right the court
needed for its analysis.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals subsequently reversed one of
the cases, rejecting the plaintiffs facial challenge to the voter ID law
in light of the "concessions" the plaintiff made regarding the
legislature's authority to enact voter registration requirements. 1 69 The
appeals court, relying solely on the Wisconsin Constitution,170 ruled
that a voter ID law is not an "additional qualification" because it is
simply a means for the legislature to identify those who had registered
to vote.171 However, the court left open the possibility that plaintiffs
might succeed in an as-applied challenge if there was enough evidence
that the voter ID requirement imposed too heavy of a burden on the
state constitutional right to vote.172 It also acknowledged that the
appeal of the other trial court decision invalidating Wisconsin's voter
ID law might be different because the plaintiffs in that case had made
fact-based arguments.173
As the Wisconsin appellate decision reveals, undertaking a
state-first primacy analysis does not necessarily spell the doom of a
voter ID requirement. The Tennessee Supreme Court recently upheld
the state's voter ID law through a primacy approach.174 The court first
declared that the state had a compelling interest in preserving "the
duly enacted laws barring certain convicted felons or adjudicated incompetents/
partially incompetents.
168. Id. pt. I.
169. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 834 N.W.2d 393, 1 3, at
396 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
170. Id. 1 7 n.2, at 397 ("[W]e make note of, but see no reason to discuss further, the United
States Supreme Court's split opinion addressing a facial challenge, under the federal
constitution, to an Indiana law requiring photo identification to vote.").
171. Id. It 55-57, at 407. This holding reveals that employing a primacy approach still
allows states to impose election regulations, especially when a court narrowly construes the state
constitution's grant of the right to vote. Whether the Wisconsin appellate court was correct in its
substantive analysis regarding the scope of the constitutional provision is subject to question,
especially because the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions are quite different with respect to
granting the right to vote. Ultimately, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court will likely have
the final say on this issue.
172. Id.
7 n.2, at 397.
173. Id.
174. City of Memphis v. Hargett, No. M2012-02141-SC-R11-CV, 2013 WL 5655807 (Tenn.
Oct. 17, 2013).

118

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1:89

integrity of the election process" and that the law achieved that goal
even if there was no actual evidence of voter fraud. 175 The court then
decided that, under Tennessee's constitution, a voter ID law was not
an additional "qualification" because it is "more properly classified as
a regulation pertaining to an existing voting qualification."1 76
Although this proposition is debatable as an interpretive and
evidentiary matter,'77 it at least rests solely on the Tennessee
Constitution and Tennessee case law. The court's reasoning was too
conclusory on this point-simply declaring without much explanation
that the voter ID law did not impose an additional qualification-but
its approach was sound in that it focused on its own state-specific
analysis as opposed to relying on federal interpretation. Part IV of this
Article explains why the court was wrong as a substantive matter,178
but the court's methodology was proper because it left room for the
Tennessee Constitution to provide more robust protection to the right
to vote than is permissible under current federal jurisprudence.179
An independent
and
adequate
state constitutional
interpretation of voting protections, furthermore, avoids possible
oversight by the U.S. Supreme Court. This is because there is no
federal issue at stake so long as the scope of the state right does not

175. Id. at *11-12.
176. Id. at *16.
177. See, e.g., Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 211-12 (Mo. 2006) (invalidating the
Missouri voter ID law as infringing Missouri citizens' right to vote under the Missouri
Constitution); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553,
pts. VIII-IX (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6) (finding that the voter ID law added an additional
qualification to vote contrary to the express grant of the right to vote in the Wisconsin
Constitution), cert. granted,No. 2012AP557-LV, 2012 WL 1020254 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28), cert.
denied, 811 N.W. 2d 821 (Wis. 2012).
178. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that a voter ID law is an additional qualification to vote).
179. At least two other state supreme courts also have employed the primacy approach in a
voting-rights challenge.
The Maryland Supreme Court gave its state constitution's "right of suffrage" provision
independent scope, separate from any federal constitutional analysis, in a case involving
Maryland's practice of switching voters to "inactive" status and then removing them from the
voter registration list after a period of inactivity. Md. Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 832
A.2d 214, 221-22 (Md. 2003). The court declared that the Maryland Constitution's provisions on
voting rights are "even more protective of rights of political participation than the provisions of
the federal Constitution" and therefore that the "right to vote is not subject to expiration for
voter inactivity or for any other non-constitutional qualification." Id. at 221-22, 228-29.
The Kansas Supreme Court used the primacy approach in a case over the
constitutionality of a law allowing for mail-in voting in certain situations, declaring that under
the Kansas Constitution, "voters are constitutionally guaranteed the right to a secret ballot."
Sawyer v. Chapman, 729 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Kan. 1986) (citing KAN. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
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fall below the federal floor.180 A state court could still decide that the
rights under its own constitution are identical to the rights under the
U.S. Constitution. 8 1 It will do so, however, through an independent
analysis, not because it gives any deference to federal court
interpretation. Moreover, the fact that state constitutions textually
grant the right to vote, while the U.S. Constitution does not, should
counsel against states adopting the federal standard as their own.182
As many of the voting-rights cases discussed above demonstrate,
courts that use the primacy approach in the election context typically
recognize that state constitutions provide a broader right to vote than
the U.S. Constitution.
The main benefit of the primacy approach for the constitutional
right to vote is that it gives full force to the broader protection of
voting rights contained within state constitutions. Federal case law
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause is still important because it
furnishes a baseline of constitutional protection for the right to vote,
couched in terms of equality. It therefore provides a framework for a
lower limit on the kinds of election regulations states may impose. But
again, state constitutions are more explicit than the U.S. Constitution
when it comes to right to vote. State constitutions interpreted through
a primacy methodology thus confer a more robust complement to
federal Equal Protection Clause analysis. As explained below, there
are strong reasons for a widespread adoption of the primacy approach
for all state constitutional cases involving the fundamental,
constitutional right to vote.
IV. THE PROPER MODE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FOR THE
RIGHT TO VOTE

There are two reasons to reject the lockstep approach and to
embrace one of the state-focused methods of constitutional
interpretation that allows courts to recognize and give independent
180. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) ("Respect for the independence of
state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of
this Court's refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and independent state ground.");
see also Anderson & Oseid, supra note 97, at 876 ("If a state court's decision rests on state
grounds that are independent and adequate to support the decision, then the Supreme Court
cannot review that decision even if the case also involves federal issues.").
181. Utter & Pitler, supra note 101, at 647 ("Although the primacy approach may insulate
state decisions from Supreme Court review, state primacy does not necessarily result in state
court decisions expanding upon federal minimums.").
182. This suggests that the Wisconsin appellate analysis in the voter ID litigation was
incorrect. See supra note 171.
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force to state constitutional provisions granting voting rights. First,
the right to vote is so foundational to our democratic system that it
deserves the most robust protection possible. 183 Second, the U.S.
Constitution explicitly says that we should look at state rules for voter
eligibility. 184
Ultimately, the primacy approach is the most appropriate
interpretative method for protecting the constitutional right to vote. It
authorizes a state court to give initial effect to its state constitution's
more explicit conferral of voting rights, while still recognizing the
federal floor if needed. Primacy acknowledges that state constitutions
are different from the U.S. Constitution when it comes to the right to
vote, thereby ensuring that the most important right in our democracy
enjoys full constitutional protection. Primacy also adheres to the U.S.
Constitution's understanding of the right to vote by doing exactly
what the U.S. Constitution says-giving primary focus to state rules
on voting rights but also abiding by the implied federal right under
the Equal Protection Clause where necessary.
A. The Right to Vote Deserves the Most Robust Protection Possible
There is a simple reason to analyze state constitutions' explicit
safeguards of voting rights faithfully and independently from federal
jurisprudence: the right to vote is the most fundamental and
important right that we have. It therefore deserves the strongest
protection possible.
A state constitution exists and is legitimate only because the
state's residents have decided to adopt it through democratic means.
As one of the Wisconsin trial courts considering the state's voter ID
law explained:
The people's fundamental right of suffrage preceded and gave birth to our
Constitution (the sole source of the legislature's so-called "plenary authority"), not the
other way around. Until the people's vote approved the Constitution, the legislature had
no authority to regulate anything, let alone elections. Thus, voting rights hold primacy
over implicit legislative authority to regulate elections. In other words, defendants'
argument that the fundamental right to vote must yield to legislative flat turns our
constitutional scheme of democratic government squarely on its head.
This is why, over the years, although recognizing that the legislature and governor
are accorded implicit authority to enact laws regulating elections, our Supreme Court

183. Consider Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (recognizing that the right to vote
is "a right at the heart of our democracy"), and Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S.
441, 450 (1974) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("Other rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.")).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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has repeatedly admonished that such laws cannot destroy or substantially impair a
18 5
qualified elector's right to vote.

The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that "[n]o right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined."186 As Professor James Gardner has explained, "The
meaning of the right to vote is among the most contentious, highly
charged questions in all of contemporary law. To a degree unmatched
in other areas, judicial and legislative actions affecting the right to
vote may have immediate and decisive impacts on the nation's public
life."187 Because of its foundational importance on so many areas, we
must protect the right to vote vigorously from political manipulation
and curtailment.
But federal court protection has not lived up to this lofty goal.
Instead, under the Burdick balancing test, the Supreme Court has
vacillated between using strict scrutiny and a lower level of scrutiny
depending on whether the law in question imposes a severe burden on
voting rights.188 If federal courts were serious about preserving the
right to vote, then they would always employ strict scrutiny review to
laws that burden political participation. Courts' failure to do so leads
to a narrowing of voting-rights protection. We need not, however, rely
on federal courts to safeguard the right to vote robustly. State
constitutions provide a textual hook for state courts to fill this void.
State courts must employ the primacy approach if they truly seek to
protect the most fundamental and foundational right in our
democracy.
B. Lockstepping the Right to Vote Is Inconsistent with Our
ConstitutionalStructure
There are at least three reasons to reject a lockstep approach to
interpreting the right to vote under state constitutions. First, the text
of the U.S. Constitution says that states will determine voter

185. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669, 2012
WL 763586, pt. II (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12), cert. granted, No. 2012AP584, 2012 WL 1020229 (Wis.
Ct. App. Mar. 28), cert. denied, 811 N.W. 2d 821 (Wis. 2012).
186. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
187. James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political
Influence: A Reconsiderationof the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 893 (1997).
188. See Douglas, supra note 5, at 162 (describing the Court's different approaches to
election law disputes).
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qualifications. 189 Federal courts should therefore look to state rules,
not the other way around. Second, the history of the constitutional
structure for voting rights portends a greater role for state definitions
of the right to vote. Third, lockstepping goes against the ideal of
judicial federalism, which suggests that state constitutions should
play a significant role in protecting individual liberties. This Section
discusses each concept and explains why they counsel against
lockstepping state constitutional right-to-vote provisions with U.S.
Supreme Court voting-rights jurisprudence.
1. Constitutional Text
Lockstepping explicit state constitutional grants of the right to
vote with the narrower, implied federal right is contrary to the U.S.
Constitution. Doing so subjugates the role states are supposed to play
in determining the qualification of voters. The U.S. Constitution does
not define who has the right to vote; it delegates that responsibility to
the states. Article I, Section 2 provides that, for elections to the House
of Representatives, "electors in each state shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state
legislature."190 The Seventeenth Amendment provides the same test
for U.S. Senate elections. 19 1 Thus, the U.S. Constitution explicitly
leaves the question of who is eligible to vote in U.S. congressional
elections to the states.
Most election law derives from the states; the U.S. Constitution
delegates to the states in the first instance the right to dictate the
times, places, and manner of holding elections and provides that
states determine rules for voter qualifications.192 State constitutions
give a specific grant of voting rights to the state's residents. They say
that citizens of the United States who are residents of the state "shall
be qualified to vote" or are "qualified elector [s]."1 93 By contrast, the
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
190. Id.
191. Id. amend. XVII.
192. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from
State ConstitutionalAttempts to Control Gerrymandering,37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 886 (2006) ("[B]y
far the most important source of law structuring the American political arena is state law.").
Congress can still enact voting rules, such as a nationwide law concerning voter ID, under the
Elections Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("[Bjut the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations . . . ."); RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA
2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 199 (2012) (advocating for a government-issued
nationwide voter ID).
193. See supra Part II.B (discussing state constitutional grants of the right to vote).
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U.S. Constitution does not directly grant the right to vote to anyone; it
says through negative language that states may not deny voting rights
to certain groups of people.194 Moreover, federal precedent on the right
to vote merely requires equality.195
Lockstepping is therefore an inappropriate method of inquiry
for the right to vote. If we are faithful to the U.S. Constitution's
delegation of voter eligibility rules to the states, then there is nothing
with which to lockstep. It is incongruent to lockstep a state's more
specific voting rules with a completely different provision of the U.S.
Constitution that actually says nothing specifically about the right to
vote.196 Lockstepping a state's equal protection clause with the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause may be
conceptually consistent because the language of the two provisions is
similar and both kinds of clauses exist to achieve the same thingequality. 197 But when there is a state constitutional provision with no
federal counterpart, state courts should not use lockstepping. 198
State constitutional provisions on the right to vote are
meaningfully and textually different from the U.S. Constitution's
protections. Justice Scalia acknowledged this point in his recent
decision in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council, recognizing that the U.S.
Constitution's Elections Clause gives Congress the authority to
194. See supra Part II.A (discussing the lack of a specific enumeration of the right to vote in
the U.S. Constitution and the underpinnings of the implied federal right to vote within various
constitutional clauses).
195. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000):
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise.
Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted
the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate
treatment, value one person's vote over that of another.
196. For a similar argument with respect to state constitution education clauses, see Scott R.

Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in School Finance
Litigation. 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 351-52, 360 (2011); see also id. at 305 ("It is surprising
that conceptions of individual rights and legislative powers in state and federal courts largely
converge, even where the unit of analysis is a state constitutional enumeration with no federal
analogue.").
197. See, e.g., Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 74-75 (Ga. 2011)
(lockstepping the Georgia Constitution's equal protection provision with the U.S. Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause).
198. Cf. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Wat Does-and Does Not-Ail State Constitutional Law, 59 U.
KAN. L. REV. 687, 707-08 (2011) ("Why the meaning of a federal guarantee proves the meaning of
an independent state guarantee is rarely explained and often seems inexplicable."); Robert F.

Williams, A "Row of Shadows": Pennsylvania's Misguided Lockstep Approach to Its State
ConstitutionalEquality Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 343, 347 (1993) (arguing that courts that
lockstep state constitutional provisions with federal rights ignore or render the state provisions a
"mere row of shadows" (citing State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J.,
concurring))).
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override state legislative choices on the "times," "places," and
"manner" of holding elections but not on the qualification of voters.199
States retain the authority to prescribe voting qualifications. As
Justice Scalia explained, the Founders sought to split the authority to
regulate elections between Congress and the states because they
feared concentrated power: 200 "Prescribing voting qualifications,
therefore, 'forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the
national government.' "201 It follows that state courts should give
independent force to their constitutional language that determines
voter eligibility.
A lockstepping approach, however, thwarts a state court's
ability to provide the heightened level of protection that state
constitutions' direct provision of the right to vote demands.
Lockstepping diminishes the significance of state constitutional grants
of the right to vote. 202 Put succinctly, although there is no federal right
to vote in the U.S. Constitution, there is an explicit right to vote under
state constitutions. This textual difference, combined with the U.S.
Constitution's express delegation of voter eligibility rules to the states,
compels the conclusion that lockstepping state constitutional
protections for voting rights is incompatible with our constitutional
structure. 203

199. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258 (2013) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).

200. Id.
201. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961)).
202. See Sutton, supra note 198, at 707 ("Some state courts diminish their constitutions by
interpreting them in lockstep with the Federal Constitution. . . .").
203. In a related context, state courts have been ineffective at curtailing partisan
gerrymandering in part because they have failed to recognize the differences between the federal
and state constitutions with respect to the rules for apportionment. See Gardner,supra note 187,
at 927-28:
[Blecause most state courts did not begin to construe their own constitutions until
after federal courts had already begun to construe related provisions of the U.S.
Constitution, state courts often simply imported the terminology and conceptual
templates of federal constitutional law into the state constitutional jurisprudence
when an independent inquiry into the meaning of state constitutional provisions
might have been more illuminating, thereby diminishing the utility and
persuasiveness of their analyses.
See also Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the
Latest Round of CongressionalRedistricting,2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 210-11 (2003) (noting that "it
may be difficult to convince state courts not to follow" U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding
partisan gerrymandering).
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2. History
The history of placing the right to vote within state authority
also counsels against the lockstep approach. Well before the adoption
of the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions already granted the right
to vote to the state's citizens. The U.S. Constitution maintained this
structure. 204 Founding-era state constitutions contained provisions
explicitly granting the right to vote, which might provide one reason
why the U.S. Constitution did not also include this protection: the
state constitutions could already do this work. Delegates to the
Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1776-including James
Madison-debated several suffrage clauses before settling on
Virginia's formulation: "'That elections of members to serve as
representative of the people, in assembly, ought to be free; and that all
men, having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with,
and attachment to, the community, have the right of suffrage.' "205
Thus, James Madison was aware that Virginia's Constitution already
explicitly preserved the right to vote. The same is true of Richard
Bassett, a delegate to the federal constitutional convention in
Philadelphia who led Delaware's constitutional convention of 1776
and was a delegate to Delaware's second constitutional convention. 206
Basset was in charge of a committee that adopted Delaware's
Declaration of Rights, which "provided for free elections and granted
the franchise to all white, male Christians, including Roman
Catholics." 207 Vermont's 1777 constitution also included the right of
universal suffrage. 208
204. See KEYSSAR, supra note 3, at 4-7, 23-24 (describing the approach to suffrage laws in
colonial times and the Framers' decision not to mention voting in the U.S. Constitution beyond
art. I, § 2).
205. JOHN J. DINAN, THE VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION 5 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 2011) (2006) (citing Robert Hilldrup, The Virginia Convention of 1776: A Study in
Revolutionary Politics 191-93 (May 1, 1935) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Virginia) (on file with University of Virginia Library)); see also VA. CONST. art. I, § 6. Hilldrup
explains that there was "considerable struggle" during the debate over the article containing this
language. Hilldrup, supra,at 191. He also points out that the text includes potentially restrictive
clauses that might curtail the right to vote, such as the requirement that voters have "sufficient
evidence of permanent common interest with and attachment to the community." Id. at 191-92.
This language suggests that the constitutional provision is more "conservative" than a
seventeenth-century law the drafters of the Virginia constitution supposedly considered. Id. at
193.
206. RANDY J. HOLLAND, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION 6-7 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2011) (2012).

207. Id.
208. WILLIAM C. HILL, THE VERMONT STATE CONSTITUTION 9 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 2011) (1992).
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The Founding Fathers likely felt no need to insert a right-tovote provision in the U.S. Constitution due to the preceding direct
state grants of that right. 209 Moreover, it would have been difficult
politically for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution to include a
national right to vote given the serious debate among the Founders
and in the states about who should enjoy the franchise. 210 The
Founders specifically did not want to allow Congress to determine
voter eligibility, because "[a] Congress empowered to regulate the
qualifications of its own electorate . . . could 'by degrees subvert the

Constitution.' "211 Instead, the drafters provided in Article I, Section 2
that voter eligibility for federal elections was dependent on state
eligibility rules. This provision was a "compromise, an outgrowth both
of an ideologically divided constitutional convention and the practical
politics of constitutional ratification," but it was possible specifically
because state constitutions already conferred the right to vote. 212
Accordingly, we need not locate the right to vote in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, especially given
that it exists already within the state constitutions. 2 13 This is not to
suggest that we should abandon federal voting-rights jurisprudence,
as the Equal Protection Clause provides a useful floor for the right to
vote. But it does mean that federal law is not the only source of the
constitutional right to vote.
3. Judicial Federalism
Lockstepping is also inconsistent with judicial federalism,
which posits that courts should recognize state constitutions as
providing their own source of individual rights protection. 214 As
209. For a fuller historical picture of founding era understanding of the Elections Clause and
voter qualification rules, see Kirsten Nussbaumer, Republican Election Reform and the
American Montesquieu 12-13 (June 28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available
(discussing the tradition of
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1898406)
"fixing suffrage" through constitutional text).
210. See KEYSSAR, supra note 3, at 5-7 (describing the wide variety among the states' laws
for voter qualifications based on residency, sex, race, religion, and property interests).
211. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258 (2013) (quoting 2
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 250 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 1966)).
212. See KEYSSAR, supra note 3, at 21.
213. See AMAR, supra note 38, at 186-87 (explaining that, at the time of its adoption, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was not understood to encompass voting
rights).
214. See G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1097, 1097 (1997) (describing the increased reliance on state constitutions as "new judicial
federalism").

2014]1

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE

127

Justice Brennan wrote in his seminal Harvard Law Review article,
"the decisions of the [U.S. Supreme] Court are not, and should not be,
dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart
provisions of state law." 215 Instead, "state courts no less than federal
are and ought to be the guardians of our liberties."216 Justice Brennan
focused his article on advocating against lockstepping for clauses in
state constitutions that are textually identical to a U.S. constitutional
counterpart, such as provisions in the Bill of Rights. 217 The right to
vote is even further removed from a legitimate lockstep analysis
because there is no direct federal analogue.
In addition, lockstepping "contradicts the historical
relationship between the state and federal constitutions." 218 Whenever
the U.S. Supreme Court issues a decision under the U.S. Constitution
involving individual rights, it does so within the context of promoting
a uniform rule for all fifty states. 219 There is always an aspect of
federalism inherent in a decision to narrow the scope of a federal
right: state constitutions may be more expansive. 220 This is why
"[U.S.] Supreme Court interpretations of the federal constitution as
applied against the states should not be viewed as presumptively valid
precedent for state constitutional analysis."22' More specifically, when
a federal court's interpretation of a right as important as voting is
narrower than a state constitution's explicit demand, a state court is
wrong to mirror the state's protection to match the federal rule.
As Justice Brennan explained, state courts should give their
constitutions independent force when they disagree with U.S.
Supreme Court decisions on an important issue of individual
liberties. 222 Moreover, state courts that robustly protect rights can

215. Brennan, supra note 156, at 502.
216. Id. at 491.
217. See, e.g., id. at 498-502 (discussing state versions of protections embodied in the Bill of
Rights).
218. Utter & Pitler, supra note 101, at 646.
219. See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Court
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 396 (1984) (explaining
that, in its constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court considers the fact that "federal
constitutional interpretations apply a uniform national mandate to a diverse group of state
governments").
220. Id.
221. Id. at 397.
222. Brennan, supra note 156, at 502; cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978) (positing that
"constitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood to
be legally valid to their full conceptual limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short of
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help to check more restrictive federal jurisprudence and, ultimately,
national power.2 23 State courts should therefore use a state-focused
interpretative method, such as primacy, that allows them to recognize
state constitutions as more protective of voting rights than the U.S.
Constitution. This is the best method to elevate the importance and
significance of the right to vote in an era of restrictive U.S. Supreme
Court rulings.
Having state courts provide more robust protection than
federal courts on the right to vote might flip on its head the "myth of
parity," which posits that "persons advancing federal constitutional
claims against local officials will fare better, as a rule, in a federal,
rather than a state trial court" and that "federal district courts are
institutionally preferable to state appellate courts as forums in which
to raise federal constitutional claims." 224 Professor Burt Neuborne, in
expounding upon the benefits of adjudicating individual rights in
federal court, suggested that federal judges are more open to
constitutional claims because they are better equipped to conduct
complex analysis, psychologically predisposed to protecting individual
liberties, and insulated from majoritarian pressures. 225 Rejecting a
lockstep approach inherently renounces federal courts' protection of
the right to vote as deficient and questions the myth of parity for
voting-rights issues.
But current federal court jurisprudence on voting rights
necessitates a shift on how we compare federal and state court
interpretation. Federal courts undertheorize the liberty interest in
voting, particularly through the amorphous Burdick severe burden
test.2 2 6 State courts, using their state constitutions, can make up for
this deficiency by analyzing faithfully their constitutional provisions
granting the right to vote. 2 27 That is, federal courts do not even need to
give robust treatment to the implicit right to vote under the
Fourteenth Amendment, even if they should, because the right to vote
these limits should be understood as delineating only the boundaries of the federal courts' role in
enforcing the norm").

223. See James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1033 (2003) ("State
judicial rejection of excessively narrow Supreme Court precedents concerning the scope of
individual rights helps check national power in at least four ways.").
224. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-16 (1977).
225. Id. at 1120-21.
226. See supra Part II.A (describing the difficulty plaintiffs face under the Burdick severe
burden test to establish that a state voting law violates the federal Equal Protection Clause).
227. Cf. Hasen, supra note 59, at 97 (suggesting a statutory canon of construction in favor of
"democracy" to fill the void of "underenforced constitutional norms of equality in voting").
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is also a state right-as Article I, Section 2 and the state constitutions
themselves demonstrate. Moreover, the direct, specific language
granting voting rights in state constitutions provides a textual hook
for a state court to provide broader protection to the right to vote than
a federal court might under the implicit language of the U.S.
Constitution. The myth of parity has not panned out for the right to
vote, requiring state courts to fill the void left under federal doctrine.
In sum, there are textual, historical, and jurisprudential
reasons for rejecting the lockstep methodology to the right to vote.
Lockstepping, however, is the prevalent approach, perhaps because it
is common in other areas of law, especially when the federal and state
constitutional texts are the same or very similar. 228 Moreover,
lockstepping promotes uniformity between federal and state analyses
on an issue that both the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions
explicitly address. But state constitutions go well beyond the U.S.
Constitution in granting voting rights. Judicial interpretation should
follow suit.
C. Primacy Provides the Best InterpretativeMethod for the Right to
Vote
Textually and jurisprudentially, primacy presents the best
approach for voting rights. The U.S. Constitution already directs a
state primacy approach to the right to vote by pointing to state rules
for voter eligibility. 2 2 9 State constitutions fill this gap by explicitly
defining who enjoys the right to vote.
Primacy-based analyses should guide future litigation over
voter-eligibility issues, such as voter ID requirements. State courts
should first determine whether a particular election regulation goes
beyond the bounds of what the state constitution permits. If
necessary, the court can then resort to an analysis under the federal
floor to ensure that judicial interpretation of the state constitution's
protections are not less than the federal rules for voting rights, which
include the U.S. Supreme Court's Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence. This is why the Wisconsin courts were correct and the
Pennsylvania court wrong in their state constitutional analyses in the
2012 voter ID litigation. 230 Put Simply, state courts must give their
228. See Williams, supra note 101, at 1502 (noting that state courts tend to follow federal
constitutional doctrine in the majority of cases).
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
230. There could, of course, be a more nefarious explanation for the choice of interpretative
methodologies-lockstep or not-in these voter ID cases: the judges may have been trying to
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state constitutions independent force in determining the
constitutionality of a voter ID law.
The primacy approach, importantly, does not abandon all
federal jurisprudence on voting rights. The federal floor still provides
a significant level of protection that ensures state voting rules do not
dip below a certain threshold. Equal protection is an important
concept that undergirds the development of election law. 23 1 In
addition, federal courts often can be more independent protectors of
the right to vote in the face of manipulation by partisan
legislatures. 232 The U.S. Constitution also has meaningful negative
protections, such as prohibitions on race-, sex-, or age-based voting
restrictions. Furthermore, the U.S. Constitution is important in
directing our inquiry for eligibility questions to the states via Article I,
Section 2. We should not (and cannot, under the Supremacy Clause)
abandon an approach that considers the right to vote under the U.S.
Constitution and federal precedent where necessary. But state courts
should resort to the lesser federal protection only after analyzing fully
whether their more robust state constitutions fail to safeguard
individuals' voting rights. Thus, state constitutions augment the
federal floor in addition to filling in the gaps from Article I, Section 2.
Courts should consider state constitutions first before falling back on
the U.S. Constitution regarding the right to vote.
reach a particular result based on ideology. Both Wisconsin trial court judges were Democrats,
and they invalidated the state's voter ID law under a nonlockstep approach. See Richard L.
Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, JudicialBackstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1865, 1875 (2013) (noting that the Wisconsin Judges were Democrats). The
Pennsylvania trial court judge who upheld the law through lockstepping was a Republican. See
Francis Wilkinson, Pennsylvania Voter ID Judge Rescues Republicans, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-04/pennyslvania-voter-id-judge-rescues-republi
cans.html (identifying the Pennsylvania trial judge as a Republican). But the potential resultsdriven nature of judicial decision making does not obscure the need for a reasoned doctrinal
justification for choosing one interpretive methodology over another. Indeed, recognizing the
existence of a principled approach at least might cabin state courts that otherwise would affirm a
law that restricts voting rights for fear of overturning the legislature, as it would require the
court to justify its departure from the constitutional text.
231. See, e.g., Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlighting an
Inconsistent Considerationof Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2009) ("In
recognizing the state's interest in combating fraud in elections, early federal court opinions
instruct courts to balance protection of the fundamental right to vote under the Equal Protection
Clause . . . against the government's duty to protect the integrity of the electoral process."); Gilda
Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343, 371-72 (2010) (stating that the Equal Protection
Clause assists the government "in its pursuit of free access to the franchise").
232. See Hasen, supra note 230, at 1870 ("The judicial reaction [to Republican legislative
overreach to contract voting rights] suggests that courts may now be more willing to act as
backstops to prevent egregious cutbacks in voting rights and perhaps to do even more to assure
greater equality and fairness in voting.").
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This analysis, in turn, means that plaintiffs should advocate
against an approach that looks solely to federal law when challenging
a state's voter ID requirement. Of course, there could still be a valid
federal equal protection as-applied challenge if there is enough
evidence that the law disproportionately affects a particular group of
voters-Crawford said as much. 23 3 But no court has sustained an
equal protection as-applied challenge. 234 Therefore, it makes sense for
litigants to focus on state constitutions.
Pennsylvania's constitution is emblematic. Article VII, Section
1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
Every citizen 21 years of age, possessing the following qualifications, shall be
entitled to vote at all elections subject, however, to such laws requiring and regulating
the registration of electors as the General Assembly may enact.
1. He or she shall have been a citizen of the United States at least one month.
2. He or she shall have resided in the State 90 days immediately preceding the
election.
3. He or she shall have resided in the election district where he or she shall offer to
vote at least 60 days immediately preceding the election, except that if qualified to vote
in an election district prior to removal of residence, he or she may, if a resident of
Pennsylvania, vote in the election district from which he or she removed his or her
235
residence within 60 days preceding the election.

That is, Pennsylvania's constitution directly grants the right to vote to
every U.S. citizen who is a resident of the state and is over 21 years
old. The only exception the state constitution provides is for duly
enacted laws about registration.
A voter ID law imposes an additional qualification on top of
citizenship, residence, and age. Without an ID, a citizen simply may
not vote, even if he or she meets the constitutionally enumerated
qualification requirements. Thus, the state has created a category of
ineligible voters-those who do not possess an ID-beyond what the
constitution allows.2 36 Such a law has nothing to do with registration
but is rather about the voting process itself. 237 The Pennsylvania
233. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203 (2008); see also Douglas,
supranote 63, at 669 (discussing the relevance of Crawford's "as-applied only" rule).
234. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (10th
Cir. 2008) (rejecting as-applied challenge).
235. PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
236. See infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text (discussing state-imposed criteria for
voter eligibility beyond what the constitution permits).

237. The Tennessee Supreme Court equated
requirement, declaring that the law "pertain[s] to
Memphis v. Hargett, No. M2012-02141-SC-R11-CV,
2013). But this bald declaration begs the question

its voter ID law with a registration
an existing voting qualification." City of
2013 WL 5655807, at *16 (Tenn. Oct. 17,
of why the voter ID is not an additional

132

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 67:1:89

plaintiffs, therefore, should not have conceded that the Pennsylvania
voter ID law would be constitutional if the state enacted "reasonable
voter education efforts, reasonably available means for procuring
identification, and reasonable time allowed for implementation."238
That concession may have been proper under current federal Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence, but the admission leaves the door
open for the court to uphold the law under the state constitution once
the state achieves these implementation efforts. The plaintiffs,
however, did not invoke the federal Equal Protection Clause in their
suit. Moreover, this mode of analysis is textually inconsistent with the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Of course, the plaintiffs probably made
this statement because they recognized (or feared) that the court
would likely look to federal precedent-and in particular Crawfordin its analysis of the state constitution and were trying to distinguish
that decision on its facts. But by doing so, the plaintiffs assented to
the validity of lockstepping the right to vote.
Separate from and in addition to the federal constitutional test,
the analysis under the state constitution should actually be quite
simple. The state constitution grants the right to vote subject to a few
conditions. A voter ID law is an additional condition. Unless the state
constitution also allows the legislature to impose further qualification
qualification if it separates those who may vote from those who may not. In the abstract, a voter
ID law is similar to a registration law if everyone can comply without restriction. As the court
acknowledged, however, the voter ID law imposes special hurdles on certain people (such as the
indigent) who do not already have an ID. The court did not explain, in light of these unequal
hurdles, why the law was more like a registration requirement instead of an additional
qualification to vote.
238. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. 2012). One of the plaintiffs' amici, the
AFL-CIO, made this point directly in its brief, noting that "state constitutional provisions
demand a separate analysis" from the U.S. Constitution and that "it is essential that courts in
Pennsylvania undertake an independent analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution." Brief of
Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania AFL-CIO in Support of Petitioner's Petition for Review and
Application for Special Relief in the Nature of a Preliminary Injunction at 15, Applewhite v.
Commonwealth, 2012 WL 3332376 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 15) (No. 330) (citations omitted),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edulelectionlaw/litigation/documents/BriefofAmicusCuriaePenn
sylvaniaAFL-CIOinSupportofPetitioners.pdf, vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012). The AFL-CIO brief
also explained that "the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is free to reject the conclusions of the
United States Supreme Court so long as we remain faithful to the minimum guarantees
established by the United States Constitution." Id. (citation and alterations omitted). The court
did not directly address this point in its analysis, instead simply following the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Crawford. Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *16--19. This might be because
the plaintiffs' brief was not as explicit in focusing on the independent nature of the state
constitutional protection. See Petitioner's Pre-Trial Brief and Pre-Trial Statement at 18-26,
Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376 (No. 330), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
(emphasizing
the
litigation/documents/PetitionersPre-TrialBriefandPre-TrialStatement.pdf
alleged undue burden on the fundamental right to vote).
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requirements, and unless the state justifies the law pursuant to this
power, 239 then a voter ID law goes beyond the state constitution's
prescription even if it would be permissible under the federal Equal
Protection Clause. If a state constitution does in fact broadly empower
the legislature to regulate voting, then two additional considerations
arise. First, there is a separate legal question regarding whether that
clause overrides the voter eligibility provision. Second, there is a
subsequent factual question as to whether the voter ID law actually
accomplishes this goal. But these are different inquiries from what the
Pennsylvania court considered, as it simply declared without
explanation that the voter ID law "does not attempt to alter or amend
Pennsylvania Constitution's substantive voter qualifications, but
rather is merely an election regulation to verify a voter's identity." 240
Underlying that interpretation was the federal jurisprudence in
Crawford-not a faithful reading of the explicit text of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.241
The state courts that have rejected lockstepping and embraced
the primacy approach in voter ID cases, such as those in Wisconsin
and Missouri, are correct. As the Missouri Supreme Court declared,
"Due to the more expansive and concrete protections of the right to
vote under the Missouri Constitution, voting rights are an area where
our state constitution provides greater protection than its federal
counterpart."242 This is not to say that voter ID laws are per se
unconstitutional. 243 The Georgia Supreme Court upheld Georgia's
voter ID law after a separate interpretation of its own constitution. 244
The question in that instance, however, is not over the
appropriateness of the Georgia court's interpretative methodology; it
is instead about whether the court was correct in its substantive
analysis of the Georgia Constitution.
Although rejecting the lockstep approach could lead some
states to try to amend their constitutions to provide the legislature
with greater authority to regulate elections or to adopt voter ID

239. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. V, § 4 ("The legislature shall provide by law for proper proofs
of the right of suffrage.").
240. Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *16.
241. Id. at *16-19 (emphasizing the Supreme Court's reasoning in Crawford).
242. Weinschenck v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 212 (Mo. 2006).
243. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Hargett, No. M2012-02141-SC-R11-CV, 2013 WL 5655807,
at *1 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2013) (upholding Tennessee's voter ID law under the Tennessee
Constitution).
244. See Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 74-75 (Ga. 2011).
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requirements, this is an example of democracy at work.2 4 5 A state's
citizens could decide whether they want to give the legislature that
power. An analysis of a voter ID law under a state constitution that
delegates to the legislature robust authority to regulate the voting
process in one clause does not mangle the state constitution's explicit
grant of the right to vote in another, so long as a court can read these
clauses in harmony. 246 As it stands, however, most state constitutions
give the legislature authority to regulate the registration process or
absentee balloting, not to impose additional voter qualification
rules. 247
A court invoking the proper analysis in light of a constitutional
delegation of authority to the legislature still must conduct an
evidentiary inquiry into how and why the state government
implemented the voting law. For example, the Missouri court
explained that, even under the Missouri Constitution, "some
regulation of the voting process is necessary to protect the right to
vote itself."248 Even so, under the constitution, the Missouri legislature
may regulate only certain aspects of the state's voting process, such as
registration. 249 Therefore, even though "many matters may
tangentially affect voting,"250 the legislature may not simply concoct
new voter qualifications as it wishes. Accordingly, a state court giving
its constitution independent scope still must determine whether the
specifics of the voter ID law impose an actual burden on the right to
vote such that it becomes an additional qualification to vote. If there
are suitable alternatives for those who do not have an ID, then the
state is not imposing an additional hurdle or qualification on voting
rights because it is not creating a class of voters who would be able to
vote but for their possession of identification. 25 1 The legislature also
must have the authority to enact such a law. This is a different

245. For example, Minnesota citizens rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that
would have enacted a new voter ID requirement. See Ragsdale, supra note 18 (reporting that
only 46% of voters supported the proposed constitutional amendment to adopt a photo ID
requirement).
246. See infra Part V (addressing the presumptive invalidity of election laws that add voter
qualifications).
247. See supraPart II.B (detailing state constitutional provisions on voter qualifications).
248. Weinschenck v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 212 (Mo. 2006).
249. MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 ("Registration of voters may be provided for by law.").
250. Weinschenck, 203 S.W.3d at 212.
251. See South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that,
under South Carolina law, a voter who does not possess a photo ID can still vote so long as the
voter states in an affidavit why he or she does not have the ID).
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inquiry than the Indiana or Pennsylvania courts conducted, because it
does not rest solely on federal precedent. 252
V. THE PRESUMPTIVE INVALIDITY OF ELECTION LAWS THAT ADD VOTER
QUALIFICATIONS

A primacy approach to state constitutional interpretation of the
right to vote rejects Burdick's severe burden formation as too
deferential to state regulation of elections, as that test fails to
recognize the explicit right of suffrage within state constitutions. But
in its place, state courts need a workable test that elevates the
importance of the fundamental right to vote while still allowing
jurisdictions to run their elections. The solution, once again, is right in
front of us: the structure of state constitutions. Courts simply need to
apply faithfully what state constitutions say. 253
A. State ConstitutionalStructure
As discussed above, all but one state constitution explicitly
grants to its citizens the right to vote. 254 Most of these constitutional
provisions are couched in mandatory terms: all citizens "are qualified
electors" or "shall be entitled to vote" so long as they are U.S. citizens,
residents of the state for a certain time, and over eighteen years of
age. 255
252. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 767 (Ind. 2010) (relying
on Crawford in upholding Indiana's voter ID law); Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.
2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *15-29 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 15) (applying Crawford to uphold
Pennsylvania's voter ID law), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).
253. State courts, of course, could create other tests that also protect sufficiently the state
constitutional right to vote. The analysis presented here is one workable solution, but it is not
the exclusive way in which state courts must proceed. Indeed, courts could adopt a test that is
even more protective of voting rights.
254. See supra Part II.B (explaining that every state constitution besides Arizona's explicitly
grants the right to vote to the state's citizens).

255. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. VII,

§ 1:

Every citizen 21 years of age, possessing the following qualifications, shall be entitled
to vote at all elections . . . . 1. He or she shall have been a citizen of the United States
at least one month. 2. He or she shall have resided in the State ninety (90) days
immediately preceding the election. 3. He or she shall have resided in the election
district where he or she shall offer to vote at least sixty (60) days immediately
preceding the election . ...

Only three states' constitutions do not cast their right-to-vote provisions in mandatory
language such that citizens "shall" have the right to vote or "are" qualified electors, instead using
the permissive word "may." See Alaska Const. art. 5, § 1 ("Every citizen of the United States who
is at least eighteen years of age, who meets registration residency requirements which may be
prescribed by law, and who is qualified to vote under this article, may vote in any state or local
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State constitutions, as previously noted, also delegate authority
to state legislatures to regulate elections, but this comes only after the
state constitutions confer voting rights. That is, the right to regulate
elections is derivative of the people's right to vote. As one of the
Wisconsin trial courts considering the voter ID law explained, the
people of the state ratified the constitution, so the citizen's right to
vote arises first, before legislative authority to alter that right. 256 In
addition, the constitutional power state legislatures enjoy is based on
permissive language and is often limited to regulating certain aspects
of the election process. Pennsylvania citizens, for example, "shall be
entitled to vote at all elections subject . . . to such laws requiring and

regulating the registration of electors as the General Assembly may
enact."2 57 Other state constitutions allow legislatures to pass laws
involving absentee balloting or felon disenfranchisement.258 Some
state constitutions also permit the legislature to enact laws to
"preserve the integrity" of elections or "guard against abuses of the
elective power." 259
State constitutions thus grant the right to vote in mandatory
terms and only secondarily delegate legislative control to regulate
some aspects of the election process. The constitution, not the
legislature, confers the right to vote, so the legislature's power cannot
completely override this constitutional grant. A primary conferral of
the right to vote, which then may be subject to legislative authority, is
the only way to understand properly both the textual and contextual
grant of voting rights. That is, the legislature's power cannot outweigh
the mandatory nature of the voting protection. Courts construing
these provisions in harmony, then, must give full effect to the
mandatory, explicit nature of voting rights while still providing the
legislature with room to regulate elections consistent with
constitutional authorization.
election."); Ca. Const. art. II, § 2 ("A United States citizen 18 years of age and resident in this
State may vote."); Ind. Const. art. II, § 2 ("A citizen of the United States who is at least eighteen
(18) years of age and who has been a resident of a precinct thirty (30) days immediately
preceding an election may vote in that precinct at the election."). Given that the U.S.
Constitution points to state rules for voter eligibility, however, we should understand these
states as also requiring the provision of the right to vote to its citizens.
256. Order Granting Motion for Temporary Injunction, Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v.
Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553 (Wis. Cir. Mar. 6, 2012) (granting temporary
injunctive relief to preclude enforcement of new Wisconsin voter ID law).
257. PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added).
258. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4 (registration and absentee balloting); KAN. CONST. art.
V, § 2 (felon disenfranchisement).
259. See, e.g., COLO. CONsT. art. IV, § 11; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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B. A Two-Part Test for the State ConstitutionalRight to Vote
Given the foregoing analysis, a court considering a state
constitutional challenge to an election regulation should ask two
separate questions: (1) whether the law at issue infringes upon the
explicit constitutional grant of voting rights by adding an additional
qualification, and then (2) whether the exercise of the legislature's
power can outweigh that mandatory right. The plaintiff should have
the burden of showing that the regulation in question imposes an
additional voter qualification, while the state should have the
ultimate burden of justifying such a law.
A plaintiff satisfies his or her initial burden under this
proposed test by showing that the law creates categories-those who
may vote and those who may not-based on additional criteria not
listed in the state constitution. For example, a voter ID law is
generally an additional qualification because those voters who satisfy
all other eligibility rules still may not vote without possessing an ID,
assuming that everyone does not already have an ID or there are no
other ways the state accommodates non-ID holders. A voter ID
requirement is therefore not merely a means of proving the
constitutionally enumerated eligibility rules, as those who meet the
valid qualifications may still suffer disenfranchisement if they do not
also have the ID. By contrast, forcing a citizen to sign his or her name
at the polls, for instance, is not a qualification, even though an
individual may not vote without doing so, as it does not define who is
eligible to vote-especially because everyone has the ability to meet
this requirement (assuming there is an accommodation for disabled
voters who cannot sign their name). A signature law instead
delineates the process by which a voter casts his or her ballot and asks
nothing more. Regular election-administration laws that do not create
a group of citizens ineligible to vote for failure to satisfy the state's
requirements do not impose an additional voter qualification. Put
another way, if every voter possessed a valid ID, then the ID law
would not be an additional qualification because it would not impose a
status requirement on voters that some people cannot easily meet.
Everyone is still eligible to vote regardless of the voter ID law because
everyone has one, and the law would be regulating the process of
voting instead of delineating an additional qualification. But that is
not the reality of today's voter ID laws. To be sure, a voter ID law in a
state in which everyone owned an ID still might impose an added
burden on voters-of bringing and presenting the ID-but this is
different from distinguishing which voters may cast a ballot based on
possession of an ID. If, however, having an ID is not a universal trait,
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or the state does not otherwise accommodate those without one, then
the requirement turns into an additional voter qualification. 260
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a law imposes an additional
qualification on the right to vote, it is then the state's burden to show
why the law is a permissible exercise of its legislative authority. To do
so, the legislature must present specific findings on why the law in
question does not infringe the state constitution's explicit provision of
voting rights to its citizens. Without specific findings, a legislature
might curtail the constitutional right to vote through general
legislative declarations-contrary to the text and structure of state
constitutions.
This proposal flips the normal burden in constitutional votingrights litigation. Under the federal Burdick test, the plaintiff has the
obligation to show that the law in question burdens the right to vote to
a severe level. 261 If the plaintiff cannot do so, then a lockstepping state
court following Burdick will apply an intermediate balancing test that
largely defers to the state's justifications for the law. 26 2 In essence,
"laws pertaining to electoral mechanics carry a strong presumption of
constitutionality, even though they touch upon the fundamental rights
of voting and political association." 263 Under Burdick, then, the
plaintiff assumes the ultimate burden of proving the law's invalidity
by demonstrating the barriers the law imposes on voting rights, and
the court typically credits whatever justification the state posits for its
election regulation. 264 A court following Burdick will reverse the
presumption of validity and hold the state to a higher threshold only if
the court finds that the law imposes a severe burden. 265
Flipping the normal federal framework and imposing a
presumption of invalidity to laws that add voter qualifications is
260. There are, of course, line-drawing questions. The key inquiry for a court is whether a
state is creating a category of ineligible voters based on failure to meet a particular stateimposed criterion beyond what the constitution permits. If so, then the plaintiff can meet its
initial burden under this test.
261. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
262. Id. (noting that, if a law imposes only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" on
voting rights, then " 'the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify'
the restrictions" (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983))).
263. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 336 (2007).
264. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; see Elmendorf, supra note 263, at 327 (discussing the
deferential nature of the Burdick standard).
265. See Elmendorf, supra note 263, at, 336-37 ("Sometimes, however, an inspection of the
challenged law's form and context . . . reveals something alarming. If so, the presumption of
constitutionality may be reversed, and the Court will take a close look at the law's tailoring and
the justifications asserted for it.").
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justified because state constitutions already support this analytical
move. They explicitly confer the right to vote as an initial matter,
subject only later to a grant of power that the state legislature may
invoke. This is evident through the mandatory nature of the votingrights provision, the permissive language authorizing legislative
regulation, and the simple fact that a legislature's power cannot
override the explicit conferral of the fundamental right to vote. Courts
should therefore consider a law that adds additional voter
qualifications to be presumptively invalid under the state constitution
because the law is contrary to the constitution's explicit grant of the
right to vote. The state should then have the burden of overcoming
that presumption with direct evidence showing that the law is
consistent with the state constitution's specific conferral of legislative
power to regulate elections.
Many state constitutions limit the legislature's authority to
regulate elections to certain areas, such as the registration or
absentee balloting processes. 266 A state may enact an election law only
based on this limited power. As discussed above, a requirement that
voters show an ID to vote, when possessing an ID is not a universal
trait, is an additional qualification for voting because those who do not
have the ID are effectively denied the franchise. This rule violates a
state constitution's mandatory grant of voting rights. Once the
plaintiff meets the initial burden of showing that the law imposes an
additional qualification on the state constitutional right to vote, the
state should have the ultimate burden of justifying the legislative
power to enact the law. An ID law does not regulate the registration or
absentee balloting process. Therefore, a court construing a state
constitution that limits the legislature's power to regulate only these
aspects of the election system should invalidate a voter ID
requirement that disenfranchises some voters.
Other state constitutions, however, give slightly broader power
to the legislature to root out fraud or protect the integrity of the
election process.267 In these states, proponents would argue that a
voter ID law effectuates those goals. But instead of requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate the magnitude of the burdens a voter ID law
266. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The legislature shall provide for the registration of
voters and for absentee voting . . . .").
267. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("There shall be enacted registration and other laws
to secure the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise.); DEL. CONST.
art. V, § 1 ("[The General Assembly may by law prescribe the means, methods and instruments
of voting so as best to secure secrecy and the independence of the voter, preserve the freedom and
purity of elections and prevent fraud, corruption and intimidation thereat.").
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imposes, the state should have the obligation to prove that the voter
ID law in fact protects the integrity of the election and is therefore
consistent with the legislature's authority to override the explicit
grant of voting rights. A state may not satisfy this burden through
simple legislative findings that a voter ID law might help to root out
fraud, especially if there is no actual evidence of fraud occurring in the
state's elections. This generalized rationale should be insufficient to
outweigh the state constitution's express voting-rights provision.
Instead, courts should require states to prove through direct evidence
that the voter ID requirement actually will solve a fraud or integrity
problem occurring in the state's elections. 268 This is the only way the
state can justify its decision to override the state constitution's explicit
grant of the right to vote.
Finally, a few states give the legislature plenary power over
elections. 269 But although more contextual than textual, the analysis
is still the same: the specific conferral of the right to vote comes first,
subject only secondarily to the legislature's authority to regulate the
election process. This is because, as the Wisconsin trial court ruling on
the state's voter ID law explained, "The people's fundamental right of
suffrage preceded and gave birth to our [state c]onstitution (the sole
source of the legislature's so-called 'plenary authority'), not the other
way around. Until the people's vote approved the [state c]onstitution,
the legislature had no authority to regulate anything, let alone
elections."270 That is, a state constitution cannot grant authority to a
state legislature to override the very aspect of our democracy-the
right to vote-that gives the constitution legitimacy. Both the initial
allocation of voting rights in state constitutions and the fundamental
268. Cf David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental:The Myth of Voter Fraudand the Coming of
the Second Great Disenfranchisement,34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 530 (2008) ("[T]he test [for
analyzing a voting restriction] should require the government to detail what constitutes a
'severe' burden on a fundamental right. After all, that is the normal requirement whenever the
government seeks to infringe upon these types of rights.").
269. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ('The legislature shall adopt an election code which
shall provide for permanent registration of voters and for the conduct of all elections."); NEV.
CONST. art. II, § 6:
Provision shall be made by law for the registration of the names of the Electors within
the counties of which they may be residents and for the ascertainment by proper
proofs of the persons who shall be entitled to the right of suffrage, as hereby
established, to preserve the purity of elections, and to regulate the manner of holding
and making returns of the same; and the Legislature shall have power to prescribe by
law any other or further rules or oaths, as may be deemed necessary, as a test of
electoral qualification.
270. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669, 2012
WL 763586, at *4 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12), cert. granted, No. 2012AP584, 2012 WL 1020229 (Wis.
Ct. App. Mar. 28), cert. denied, 811 N.W. 2d 821 (Wis. 2012).
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importance of the right to vote to our democracy requires this result. A
contrary reading-that the legislature can override the explicit,
mandatory nature of the right to vote-would make the constitutional
grant of voting rights a nullity because it would be subject to
unlimited legislative curtailment. Even if the legislature has broad
authority, then, it still must use specific evidence to justify any law
that adds a voting qualification beyond what the state constitution
allows. The legislature should present articulable reasons to support a
law that curtails the right to vote in some way.
The two-part, burden-shifting analysis that this Article
espouses is akin to strict scrutiny, requiring the state to justify an
election regulation by demonstrating how it is tied specifically to the
legislature's power. 271 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
"under our Constitution . . . the States are given the initial task of

determining the qualifications of voters who will elect members of
Congress." 272 A close analysis of state constitutions reveals that those
documents explicitly grant the right to vote in unequivocal terms,
subject only to a few enumerated status qualifications and to the
legislature's authority, which is limited to certain areas in most states.
Thus, state constitutions themselves suggest that legislatures must
justify the imposition of additional voter qualifications that infringe
the right to vote. An analysis that is similar to federal strict scrutiny
review comes directly from the state constitutional text and structure,
as well as the fundamental nature of the right to vote. 273
This formulation does not require widespread judicial oversight
of elections, however, as states should be able to overcome the
presumption of invalidity in most instances for run-of-the-mill
election-administration laws. States need to regulate how an election
should operate. Many election-related laws, moreover, do not impose
additional voter qualifications but instead are about other mechanics
of the election process, such as ballot access requirements for
271. Using heightened scrutiny and rejecting deference to state legislatures for impediments
to voting rights was the original formulation of the Warren Court's right-to-vote decisions. See,
e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969) ("Accordingly, when we are
reviewing statutes which deny some residents the right to vote, the general presumption of
constitutionality afforded state statutes and the traditional approval given state classifications if
the Court can conceive of a'rational basis' for the distinctions made are not applicable.").
272. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729-30 (1974) (citing U.S. CONST art. I, § 2, cl. 1).
273. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1295 (2002) ("If . . . we believe that voting is important for more than
expressive reasons, then it is unclear why we do not recognize that a 'right to effective
representation' entails, at the very least, a presumption of a right to vote that should require a
'compelling state interest' to defeat.").
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candidates or campaign finance regulations. 274 But when a plaintiff
can demonstrate that a particular law adds an additional voting
qualification beyond what the state constitution permits, courts
should consider the law presumptively invalid under the
constitutional text. The state should then have the burden of showing
with specific evidence why it was justified in passing that law. This
mode of analysis is most faithful to a primacy approach to
constitutional protection of the right to vote and adheres most closely
to state constitutional text and structure.
VI. CONCLUSION

There have been myriad calls for Congress or the federal courts
to fix voting-rights jurisprudence to give broader protection to the
individual right to vote. 275 But the solution is in plain sight if state
courts simply read state constitutions faithfully to their text and
independently from federal jurisprudence. In locating the right to
vote, we too often look solely at the implied right under the U.S.
Constitution's negative language and the Equal Protection Clause.
Construing a voting regulation under the U.S. Constitution, however,
presents only half of the inquiry. Almost all state constitutions grant
citizens the right to vote through explicit, direct language. Yet many
state courts interpret their own state's constitution to be in lockstep
with federal constitutional law.
This "absolute harmony" lockstepping approach is backwards.
The U.S. Constitution directs the inquiry about voting qualifications
to the states, not the other way around. 276 Moreover, it makes little
sense to lockstep a state constitution's specific grant of voting rights
with the very different implied right under the general language of the
federal Equal Protection Clause. Courts construing restrictions on
voting rights should consider the broader scope of state constitutions.
A voter ID law, for example, imposes an added qualification on who
274. See Douglas, supra note 5, at 178 (distinguishing between laws that directly impact
voters with laws that only tangentially affect voters by regulating other aspects of the election
process).
275. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 58, at 572; see also Brad Plumer, We Have to Fix That,' but
Will We?, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/wehave-to-fix-that-but-will-we/2012/11/08/c83b4976-29ca-11e2-bab2-eda299503684_story.html:
Election Day saw news story after news story about interminable lines at polling
stations. In some areas, people waited for two hours, three hours or more. To many
observers, it seemed ludicrous that a country as advanced and as wealthy as the
United States can't figure out how to hold a decent election.
276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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may vote, which goes beyond the explicit mandate of all fifty state
constitutions.
The U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has contracted the
scope of the right to vote under the federal Equal Protection Clause.277
A renewed, independent focus on state constitutions and their explicit
grant of the right to vote is textually faithful to both the U.S. and
state constitutions and will restore the importance of the most
foundational right in our democracy.

277. See Douglas, supra note 5, at 151-57 (discussing Supreme Court decisions that have
created confusion for lower courts and in some cases limited the scope of the right to vote).
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VII. APPENDIX: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE RIGHT TO
VOTE

State

Explicit Grant
of the Right
to Vote2 78

Alabama 280

"shall have the
right to vote"

Alaska 281

"Every citizen ... may
vote"

Arizona 282

Elections
Shall Be
"Free," "Free
and Open," or
"Free and
Equal"

"All elections shall
be free and equal"

Arkansas2m

"any person may vote"

California284

"may vote"

Implicit Grant
of the Right to
Vote Through
Negative
Language 279

"No Person shall be
entitled to vote ...
unless"; "shall not be
denied
or abridged"

"Elections shall be
free and equal"
"may not be
conditioned by a
property
qualification"

Colorad

285

Connecticut

"shall be qualified to
vote"
286

"shall be ... an elector"

"free and open"

"No person shall be
denied .. . enjoyment
of his or her civil or
political

rights"

278. An "explicit" grant means that the state constitution includes language declaring that a
citizen "shall be qualified to vote," "shall be entitled to vote," "is a qualified elector," or other
similar language. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
279. An "implicit" grant of the right to vote means that the state constitution prohibits the
denial of voting rights based on certain characteristics, such as race or sex. See supra notes 9194 and accompanying text.
280. ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177.
281. AIASKA CONST. art. V, § 1.
282. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 21; id. art. VII, § 2.
283. ARK. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
284. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2; id. art. I, § 22.
285. COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1; id. art. II, § 5.
286. CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; id. art. I, § 20.
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State

Delaware

287

Florida 28

Georgia

89

Hawaii 290

Elections
Shall Be
"Free," "Free
and Open," or
"Free and
Equal"

Explicit Grant
of the Right
to Vote 278
"shall be entitled to
vote"

145

Implicit Grant
of the Right to
Vote Through
Negative
Language7 9

"All elections shall
be free and equal"

"shall be an elector"

"shall be entitled to
vote"
"shall be qualified to

"No citizen shall be

vote"

disfranchised, or
deprived"

Idaho291

"is a qualified elector"

"No power ... shall at

any time interfere
with . . . the right of

suffrage"
Illinois 292

"shall have the right to
vote"

"All elections shall
be free and equal"

Indiana 293

"may vote"

"All elections shall
be free and equal"

Iowa 294

shall be entitled to
vote"

Kansas29 5

shall be deemed a
qualified elector"

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2; id. art. I, § 3.
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, II.
HAW. CONST. art. II, § 1; id. art. I, § 8.
IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 2; id. art. I, §§ 19, 20.
ILL. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 3.
IND. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2.
IOWA CONST. art. II, § 1.
KAN. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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Explicit Grant
of the Right
to Vote 278

Elections
Shall Be
"Free," "Free
and Open," or
"Free and
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Implicit Grant
of the Right to
Vote Through
Negative
Language279

Equal"

Kentucky 296

"shall be a voter"

Louisiana 297

"shall have the right to
register and vote"

Maine 298

"shall be an elector"

Maryland299

"and every citizen .. .
ought to have the right
of suffrage"; "shall be
entitled

to

"All elections shall
be free and equal"

"elections ought to
be free and
frequent"

vote"

Massachusettsoo

"have an equal right to
elect officers"

Michigan301

"shall be an elector and
qualified to vote"

Minnesotao 2

"shall be entitled to
vote"

Mississippi 03

"is declared to be a
qualified elector"

Missourimw

"are entitled to vote"

"All elections
ought to be free"

"No member of this
state shall be
disfranchised"

"free and open"

Ky. CONST. §§ 6, 145.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 10(A).
ME. CONST. art. II, § 1.
MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. I, § 7; MD. CONST. art. I, § 1.
MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. IX.
MICH. CONST. art. II, § 1.
MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; id. art. I, § 2.
303. MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241.
304. MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; id. art. I § 25.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
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State

Explicit Grant
of the Right
to Vote 278

Elections
Shall Be
"Free," "Free
and Open," or
"Free and

147

Implicit Grant
of the Right to
Vote Through
Negative
Language 279

Equal"

Montana30

Nebraska

6

"is a qualified elector"

"free and open"

"shall ... be an elector"

"shall be free"

Nevada307

"shall be entitled to
vote"; also calls voting
a "privilege"

New Hampshire 308

"shall have an equal
right to vote"

New Jersey3 Os

"shall be entitled to
vote"

New Mexico 3 10

"shall be qualified to
vote"

New York311

"shall be entitled to
vote"

North Carolinaax2

"shall be entitled to
vote"

North Dakota 3 13

"shall be a qualified
elector"

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

"No person shall be
denied the equal
protection of the
laws"

"There shall be no
denial of the elective
franchise at any
election"
"All elections are
to be free"

"The right to vote
shall not be denied to
any person because of
the nonpayment of
any tax."

"All elections shall
be free and open"

"and no power ...
shall at anytime
interfere to prevent
the free exercise of
the right of suffrage"

"All elections shall
be free"

MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2; id. art. II, §§ 4, 13.
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 22; art. VI, § 1.
NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1.
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XL.
N.J. CONST. art. II, § 1, 3.
N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1; id. art. II, § 8.
N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1.
N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 1; id. art. I, § 10.
N.D. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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State

Explicit Grant
of the Right
to Vote 2 8

Elections
Shall Be
"Free," "Free
and Open," or
"Free and

Implicit Grant
of the Right to
Vote Through
Negative
Language279

Equal"

Ohio3 14

"has the qualifications
of an elector"

Oklahoma315

"are qualified electors"

"the free exercise
of the right of
suffrage"

Oregon 316

"is entitled to vote"

"All elections shall
be free and equal"

Pennsylvania317

"shall be entitled to
vote"

"Elections shall be
free and equal"

Rhode Island 318

"shall have the right to
vote"

South Carolina 319

"shall have an equal
right to elect officers";
"shall be an elector";
"is entitled to vote"
"shall be entitled to
vote"

"free and open"

"shall be entitled to
vote ... and there shall
be no other
qualification attached

"free and equal"

"The State shall
never enact any law
restricting or
abridging the right of
suffrage"

South Dakota 320

Tennessee3 21

"free and equal"
(two different
clauses)

to the right of suffrage"

TexaS322

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

"shall be deemed a
qualified voter"

OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1.
OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. art. II, § 4; id. art. I, § 6.
OR. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2.
PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1; id. art. I, § 5.
R.I. CONST. art. II, § 1.
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5; id. art. II, §§ 4, 5.
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 19; id. art. VII, § 1, 2.
TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1; id. art. I, § 5.
TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

"right of suffrage...
shall never be denied
to any person"

2014]1

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE

UTAH CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2; id. art. I, § 17.
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VIII; id. ch. II, § 42.
VA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1; id. art. I, § 19.
W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; id. art. III, § 11.
WIS. CONST. art. III, § 1.
WYO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 2; id. art. I, § 27.
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